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Unlikely Alliance Keeps Court Centered, Civility Counts for O'Connor
and Breyer
USA Today
Thursday, June 21, 2001
Joan Biskupic
A black-tie dinner at the University Club
here in February was to feature Supreme
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as
keynote speaker, with the introduction
by another conservative justice, Antonin
Scalia.
But sometime between cocktails and the
appetizer, the organizers realized that
Scalia wasn't there. Because of a
miscommunication, he had never been
officially invited. Justice Stephen Breyer
happened to be in attendance, and the
master of ceremonies sheepishly asked
him to fill in for Scalia.
Before long, Breyer, a liberal who was
named to the court by Bill Clinton, was
telling the audience about his warm
relationship with O'Connor, a Ronald
Reagan appointee. Calling O'Connor "a
colleague and a friend," Breyer told of
their travels together to legal conferences
and spoke glowingly of her work on and
off the bench.
For a few moments, the audience got a
glimpse of a friendship that has fostered
a key alliance on a divided, conservative-
led court that is still mindful of the
rancor it went through before its 5-4
ruling last December in the Florida
election case. O'Connor and Breyer were
on opposite sides in that ruling, which
gave the presidency to George W. Bush.
But the two justices have teamed up in
several major rulings over the past two
years. It is a developing partnership that
helps explain why the court, in cases
involving issues such as voting rights,
abortion and public funding of parochial
schools, has adopted a more moderate
tone than the stance its majority took in
Bush vs. Gore.
O'Connor remains part of the court's
conservative wing, which includes Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas
and Scalia. But she is most often the
court's swing vote and for years has been
the most influential justice.
That often puts her in alignment with
Breyer, who often is more moderate than
the court's other liberals: John Paul
Stevens, David Souter and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
"He's the least liberal of the liberals, and
she's the least conservative of the
conservatives," says Georgetown
University law professor Mark Tushnet,
a former Supreme Court clerk who has
written several books about the court.
Breyer has not replaced Kennedy, who
like O'Connor has been a critical swing
vote. Those two Reagan appointees are
on the same side about 90% of the time.
But Breyer's alliance with O'Connor is
distinct because they are from opposite
sides of the ideological divide and yet
find common ground -- on and off the
bench - that often keeps the court from
tilting very far to the right.
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The Breyer-O'Connor alliance also
reflects other behind-the- scenes factors
that help shape some of the decisions of
the current court, which is likely to wrap
up its term next week
* Breyer's emergence as an effective
conciliator, even though the 1994
appointee has the least tenure on the
court and is in the liberal minority.
O'Connor's sometimes-cool
relationship with the court's most
conservative justices, Scalia and Thomas.
Even when Scalia and Thomas agree
with O'Connor, they -- or she -- often
will write a separate opinion using a
different rationale. Scalia has belittled
O'Connor's legal reasoning when
disagreeing with her. Breyer, meanwhile,
seems to go out of his way to be
respectful of O'Connor in his writings,
even when they disagree.
* O'Connor and Breyer's strong desire --
shared by some other justices -- that
Bush vs. Gore not continue to cast the
court as a panel driven by partisan
politics.
Socially gregarious, O'Connor, 71, and
Breyer, 62, have tried to improve
personal relations among the justices
after the tumultuous ruling in December.
In that decision, the court's
conservatives, including O'Connor, used
an "equal protection of the law" rationale
they had rejected in cases involving
minority rights to back Bush's claim that
continuing to recount presidential ballots
would be unconstitutional. The court
was widely accused of letting politics
dictate its ruling.
Breyer said at the time, in dissent, that
the ruling could "harm not just the court,
but the nation" because the majority
intervened in a "highly political matter"
that should have been left to Florida
courts.
O'Connor and Breyer were plainly
disturbed by how the ruling
deepened existing divisions among the
justices and made the court vulnerable to
accusations that it was just another
political body.
Soon after the ruling, the two made a
point of lunching together and talking to
court clerks who were disenchanted by
the decision.
Different styles, similar views
More than their colleagues, O'Connor
and Breyer came to the bench with
experience in building consensus --
O'Connor as a former Arizona state
senator and majority leader, Breyer as a
former top aide to the
Senate Judiciary Committee.
Their styles are quite different: The tall,
stately O'Connor appears focused and
unflappable. The slightly rumpled Breyer
exudes the air of an absent-minded
professor (in fact, he taught at Harvard
Law School). His self-deprecating
manner contrasts with O'Connor's voice
of certainty. Among the least-known
justices, Breyer often jokes about being
mistaken for Souter.
But when they join forces, O'Connor
and Breyer forge rulings that reinforce
the court's center, typically settling a
specific dispute at hand while leaving
broader legal issues to be resolved
another day.
It's an indication of how similarly they
view their roles as jurists: Both see the
law as something that is built and
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defined incrementally, neither looks to
make sweeping legal pronouncements
unless a case absolutely demands it.
O'Connor said in a statement that Breyer
"is exceedingly able and has a practical
approach to problem-solving." Breyer
echoes such sentiment when referring to
her.
Analysts say theirs is an approach that
can mute the influence of ideology in
certain cases.
"I think Americans generally have more
confidence in judges who do not reach
too broadly," says John Jeffries, dean of
the University of Virginia law school.
"Justice O'Connor is a bottom-up judge.
She comes to a decision by studying the
facts of each case. And even though
Justice Breyer is more of a systematic
thinker, his opinions are quite
particular."
Off the bench
O'Connor and Breyer also have teamed
up outside the court.
They are strong supporters of the
American Bar Association's efforts to
provide guidance to nations with
evolving legal systems, such as the
former states of the Soviet Union. This
summer, they will take part in a legal
education program on American Indian
reservations.
Their teamwork on the law has been
more consequential.
A few weeks ago, Breyer persuaded
O'Connor to side with the court's liberal
wing in a key voting rights decision that
upheld a heavily black congressional
district in North Carolina.
Breyer wrote the court's opinion
rejecting a complaint by white voters that
the oddly shaped district was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander. It
was a precisely worded decision that
addressed O'Connor's worries about
racial preferences and quoted heavily
from her earlier opinions on
redistricting.
Voting rights and congressional
redistricting are among the most
contentious areas of the law, and such
cases typically are decided by
one vote: O'Connor's. The fact that she
didn't write an opinion indicated a level
of confidence in Breyer's approach. His
opinion showed that, as a practical
matter, districts that consolidate blacks
or Hispanics to boost their political
power can be constitutional.
The ruling was reminiscent of one of
Breyer's opinions last year in which he
secured O'Connor's vote to strike down
Nebraska's ban on a type of abortion
that involves removing an intact fetus.
His majority opinion borrowed many of
O'Connor's words from previous
abortion cases. It found Nebraska's ban
on such abortions unconstitutional
because the law lacked any "exception
for the preservation of the . . . health of
the mother" and imposed "an undue
burden on a woman's ability" to end a
pregnancy with what might be the most
appropriate method.
The court's liberal foursome needed
O'Connor's vote to strike down
Nebraska's law. Breyer's approach
ensured her vote.
The North Carolina and Nebraska
decisions were coups for thejunior justice. But they were made
possible only because O'Connor was
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predisposed toward the bottom-line
judgments and because Breyer used
a carefully calibrated rationale that did
not turn her off.
O'Connor often may agree with Scalia,
for example. But she clearly has been
displeased by some of his sweeping
declarations when they are on the same
side and by his sometimes sarcastic
approach when they differ.
Scalia's ridicule of O'Connor's reasoning
in past abortion cases is well known -- he
once said her rationale "cannot be taken
seriously"-- but even in lesser cases he
often cannot resist a jab. Last year, when
O'Connor wrote an opinion allowing a
city's ban on nude dancing, Scalia
criticized the reasoning for offering not
even "a fig leaf" from precedent and
performing a "neat trick" to justify
its conclusion.
When O'Connor joins Breyer, it's
because he avoids broad decrees.
In May, when the court ruled that the
media could not be held liable for
broadcasting an illegally taped private
conversation, the decisive concurring
opinion (written by Breyer and joined by
O'Connor) put some checks on the
media.
That collaboration recalled an opinion
last June in which O'Connor and Breyer
teamed up to limit the consequences of a
ruling on federal aid to parochial schools.
O'Connor and Breyer sided with the
court's conservatives in upholding a
program that gives computers and other
instructional equipment to religious
schools. But their votes came with a
catch: O'Connor, joined by Breyer,
rejected Justice Thomas' push for a
majority ruling that would have allowed
more direct public aid for
such schools.
This month, Breyer appeared to try to
win O'Connor's support in another case
involving the separation of church and
state, when the court ruled that public
schools cannot deny religious groups the
use of their facilities after-hours.
Breyer's opinion quoted extensively from
her past writings to try to limit the
breadth of the majority opinion, again
penned by Thomas. But O'Connor went
with Thomas and his endorsement of
Bible classes on school grounds for
children as young as 6.
O'Connor and Breyer "have a shared
sensibility of deciding issues narrowly,
rather than wanting to lay down broad
rules," says Richard Fallon, a Harvard
University law professor.
Jeffries agrees. The religious schools case
last year, he says, was "a perfect example
of O'Connor saying, 'This is a very large
issue. Let's not try to do it all at once.' "
O'Connor and Breyer, Jeffries says, have
a "modesty" about judging. "They do not
believe all questions can be answered all
at once."
In praise of O'Connor
A little false modesty is just what Breyer
showed at the University Club that
evening in February when he was asked
to introduce O'Connor.
He first engaged in some exaggerated
dithering, asked people at his table what
he should say, then scribbled some notes
on a scrap of paper.
But when he rose to speak, the words
seemed to come easily. He recounted
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how aftending conferences with
O'Connor had taken him around the
world, referring to recent trips to
Belgium, Germany and beyond.
"Yes," Breyer said, relating a remark
from a mutual friend: "You can't -go
wrong following Justice O'Connor."
The two justices' backgrounds
Sandra Day O'Connor
*Appointed: 1981, by Ronald Reagan
eAge: 71
*Birthplace: El Paso
*Education: Stanford University, B.A.,
1950; Stanford University, L.L.B., 1952
*Career highlights: Majority leader,
Arizona Senate; judge, Arizona Court of
Appeals
Stephen Breyer
*Appointed: 1994, by Bill Clinton
*Age: 62
*Birthplace: San Francisco
*Education: Stanford University, B.A,
1959; Oxford University, B.A., 1961;
Harvard Law, L.L.B., 1964
*Career highlights: Chief counsel, Senate
Judiciary Committee; judge, U.S. Court
of Appeals for 1st Circuit
Cases illustrate team's moderating
influence on court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, a Reagan
appointee, and Justice Stephen Breyer, a
Clinton appointee, are on different sides
of the nine-member court's ideological
divide. But in several key cases
recently, they have been a moderating
force on the conservative-led court:
* Mitchell vs. Helms, June 2000 --
O'Connor's and Breyer's votes are
critical in upholding a federal program
that provides computers and other
teaching materials to religious schools.
But they refuse to join a plurality opinion
by conservatives that could have
permitted direct public aid to parochial
schools.
* Stenberg vs. Carhart, June 2000 --
Breyer, with the help of O'Connor's key
fifth vote, writes the majority opinion
striking down a Nebraska ban on a
controversial abortion procedure. The
cautiously worded opinion acknowledges
that abortion sharply divides the nation.
* Hunt vs. Cromartie, April 2001 --
Breyer, with O'Connor as the fifth vote,
writes the majority opinion upholding a
heavily black North Carolina
ongressional district that white voters
claimed was unconstitutional.
* Bartnicki vs. Vopper, May 2001 --
O'Connor and Breyer are key to
the six-justice majority that says the
media cannot be sued for broadcasting
cellphone or other private electronic
conversations that someone else illegally
intercepted. Breyer, joined by O'Connor,
writes a separate statement saying the
opinion should be interpreted narrowly.
Copyright © 2001 USA Today
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Fla. Recount Dominated High Court's Term; Historic Ruling in
Presidential Race Reflected Divisions, New Boldness Among Justices
USA Today
Friday, June 29, 2001
Joan Biskupic
At a benefit dinner a few weeks ago,
Supreme Court Justices Anthony
Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor
took part in a mock trial of Shakespeare's
King Lear.
As O'Connor was announcing the
verdict, she teased that "it was suggested
that we (turn over) the case to the
Florida Supreme Court."
There it was: another reminder, however
lighthearted, of how deeply the high
court continues to be touched by Bush
vs. Gore, the divisive 5-4 ruling that
settled the presidential election and
turned a routine court term into one of
the most significant in decades.
The conservative-led court's decision
Dec. 12 to stop the recounting of
presidential ballots in Florida reversed
that state's high court and ensured
George W. Bush the presidency. It was
just one of 80 rulings during the nine-
month session that ended Thursday, but
it was the case that eclipsed all others,
and it shadowed the justices through the
term's end.
An appearance by conservative Justice
Antonin Scalia in Fort Lauderdale last
month drew protesters. And at the court
this week, the law clerks' annual skit
spoofed Bush vs. Gore by comparing it
with an episode of TV's Survivor.
More important, the ruling put a
spotlight on the increasing boldness of a
court that only a few years ago seemed
reluctant to enter the political fray or
play a significant role on the public stage.
Through the mid-1990s, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist's court was
defined by a focus on the narrowest
contours of legal disputes. It reversed
few precedents, rarely broke new ground
and routinely left social problems to be
resolved by elected legislators.
The Bush vs. Gore ruling was something
of an anomaly for a court that has spent
more recent years boosting state
authority at the federal government's
expense. Marching into what many
analysts viewed as a state matter, the
court's five most conservative justices
stopped the recounts favored by
Democrat Al Gore in a ruling that critics
said was dripping with partisan politics.
Viewed another way, however, the
decision -- or at least the court's
willingness to make it -- fell in line with
its recent tendency to take longer strides
in the law, and therefore be more of
a player in national affairs.
"The biggest thing about Bush vs.
Gore," says Harvard University law
professor Richard Fallon, "is that this is a
court that regards itself as the most
indispensable institution" of
government.
"It used to be that conservatism
corresponded to a position of judicial
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restraint," says Robert Schapiro, a law
professor at Emory University in
Atlanta. "But the court has become less
deferential to other branches of
government, and Bush vs. Gore reflects
that."
On Capitol Hill this spring, Kennedy
told members of a House committee
that despite concerns over whether the
Supreme Court should inject itself into
the matter, the justices believed that "it
was our responsibility" to decide the
high-stakes Florida case.
Those sentiments were echoed by Justice
Clarence Thomas during the committee
hearing on the court's budget: "I was
only interested in discharging my
responsibility, as opposed to avoiding it
and playing it safe."
Notable trends
Among the trends that marked this term:
* The continued dominance of the five
most conservative justices. Prevailing
most often in the cases that were decided
by a single vote and had the broadest
impact were Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.
That bloc repeatedly provided rulings
that curtailed federal power in favor of
the states. It went further than ever in
limiting Congress' ability to protect civil
rights, ruling in separate cases that states
could not be sued for discriminating
against disabled workers or for
regulations that disproportionately hurt
ethnic or racial minorities, such as
"English only" policies.
In the disabled workers' case, the court's
conservative majority wrote off
congressional findings attempting to
show widespread bias against the
disabled. That decision in an Alabama
case could affect millions of public
workers, but another ruling concerning
the disabled might be better known: The
court ruled, 7-2, that disabled pro golfer
Casey Martin has a right to use a cart in
competitions.
The conservatives also rejected federal
regulators' attempt to preserve isolated
wetlands that harbor migratory birds.
"It's not that the court loves the states,"
Yale University law professor Akhil
Amar says in assessing the conservatives'
moves against federal authority. "It's that
the justices hate Congress and love
themselves even more. To them, the
court really is supreme."
* Despite the solidarity on the right,
alliances shifted enough to give the left-
leaning justices some victories. The more
liberal justices -- John Paul Stevens,
David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer -- were relegated to
dissenting opinions in many of the most
significant cases. But the liberals did lead
the way in some key rulings, courtesy of
support from swing votes O'Connor and
Kennedy.
One factor was an emerging partnership
between O'Connor, a Reagan appointee
who hits her 20th anniversary this year,
and Breyer, a 1994 appointee of Bill
Clinton. Another factor was Kennedy's
concern about free-speech protections,
which put him in league with the liberals
in a decision that Congress violated free-
speech guarantees when it prevented
legal aid lawyers from challenging
welfare restrictions on behalf of indigent
clients.
On Monday, the liberals prevailed in a
ruling that upheld a federal limit on how
much political parties can spend when
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they work with a congressional
candidate's campaign. The decision in a
Colorado case, backed by O'Connor,
gave a boost to current campaign-finance
reform efforts by emphasizing Congress'
ability to crack down on wealthy
interests looking for loopholes so they
can give more money to candidates.
But generally, when the liberal justices
prevail, it is not in any broad area of the
law. There is no ground the left can
claim as its own, as the right so
dominates in questions of states' power.
Debate on Rehnquist's court "takes place
on right-wing turf," Fallon says. "This
court doesn't talk very much about
human dignity as a ground for rights any
more. The cases are focused on technical
arguments."
An example was a ruling in which the
liberals, with O'Connor's help, upheld a
heavily black North Carolina voting
district challenged by white voters as a
racial gerrymander. The court said
the state could take race into account --
just a little -- to preserve a Democratic
power base. But the starting point was a
framework established by conservatives
that makes it difficult for state lawmakers
to consider race in redistricting and to
consolidate minorities to enhance their
political power.
An air of anxiety
Beyond the meat of the term, an air of
unpredictability and anxiety hung over
the court, triggered by the politically
volatile Florida election case that so
many legal analysts had predicted the
court would refuse to hear.
After the court heard the case and ruled
for Bush, justices struggled with the
fallout. They were weary and tense with
each other, and as they returned to the
regular business of their term
they were flooded with thousands of
angry letters. Polls showed the nation
was split over whether the justices
should have gotten involved. Rumors
circulated that one or more justices
might retire.
But for all the criticism, the court did
end the election deadlock and, federal
judge Richard Posner says in a new
book, averted a potential catastrophe.
"What exactly is the Supreme Court
good for," Posner asks, "if it refuses to
examine a likely constitutional error (by
the Florida judges) that if uncorrected
may engender a national crisis?"
Conservatives rule, liberals win a few
Beyond the bitterly divided ruling that
decided the presidency, the Supreme
Court's 2000-01 term that ended
Thursday was guided largely by the
conservative majority, which led rulings
that cut back on the authority of
Congress and eased the line separating
church and state. But the court's four
liberals, with help from conservatives
Sandra Day O'Connor and Anthony
Kennedy, did prevail on a few significant
cases. Among other things, they reined
in some police powers and confirmed




* Bush vs. Gore, 5-4
* Hunt vs. Cromartie, 5-4
* PGA Tour vs. Martin, 7-2
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* Cook vs. Gralike, 9-0
--Criminal law
* Atwater vs. City of Lago Vista, 5-4
* Kyllo vs. United States, 5-4
Ferguson vs. City of Charleston, 6-3
* United States vs. Oakland Cannibis
Buyers' Cooperative, 8-0
* City of Indianapolis vs. Edmond, 6-3
* Penry vs. Johnson, 6-3
--First Amendment
* Good News Club vs. Milford Central
School, 6-3
*Bartnicki vs. Vopper, 6-3
* Legal Services Corp. vs. Velazquez, 5-4
" Federal Election Commission vs.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee, 5-4
* Lorrillard Tobacco vs. Reilly, 5-4
--Federal regulation
* Alexander vs. Sandoval, 5-4
* University of Alabama vs. Garrett, 5-4
--Business law
* Cooper industries vs. Leatherman Tool
Group, 8-1
* Circuit City Stores vs. Adams, 5-4
Eastern Associated Coal Corp. vs.
United Mine Workers of America, 9-0
*, New York Times vs. Tasini, 7-2
--Environment
* Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County vs. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 5-4
* Whitman vs. American Trucking
Assns., 9-0
--Immigration
* Immigration and Naturalization Service
vs. St. Cyr, 5-4
* Zadvydas vs. Davis, 5-4
Copyright c 2001 USA Today
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Laying Down the Law, Justices Ruled With Confidence; From Bush v.
Gore Onward, Activism Marked Past Term
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 1, 2001
Charles Lane
The 85 cases decided by the Supreme
Court in the term that concluded last
week can be neatly divided into two
categories: Bush v. Gore and everything
else.
The court, displaying an increasingly
evident confidence about its capacity and
authority to settle issues it might once
have left to other branches of government
or to the states, produced important
rulings on matters ranging from campaign
finance regulation to immigrants' rights.
But when the history of the term is
written, all of that is certain to be
overshadowed by the justices' intervention
in the deadlocked 2000 presidential
election, culminating in the Dec. 12
decision that, in effect, handed the race to
then-Texas Gov. George W. Bush.
Bush v. Gore split the court along
ideological lines, with the court's
five most conservative Republican
appointees -- Chief Justice William H
Rehnquist and Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony M.
Kennedy and Clarence Thomas -- voting
for Bush and the more liberal
justices -- John Paul Stevens, David H
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer -- issuing sharply
worded dissents in which they
accused the majority of endangering the
court's legitimacy by dragging
it into a partisan political dispute.
The conservatives appear to have had the
last laugh on that issue. Public approval
of the Supreme Court, as measured by
polls, was not dented by the election case.
About 72 percent of the public expressed
a favorable view of the court in a March
poll conducted by Princeton Survey
Research Associates.
Although the liberals may have been
defeated in Bush v. Gore, they
scored significant victories in other cases:
The court expanded immigrants' rights to
resist deportation, shored up the
Environmental Protection Agency's
authority to enforce the Clean Air Act,
upheld federal campaign finance
regulations, permitted states to draw
congressional districts in a way that would
encourage the election of minorities, and
affirmed that federal disability rights laws
entitle disabled golfer Casey Martin to ride
a golf cart in professional tournaments.
Those victories were usually made
possible by the support of O'Connor
or Kennedy -- the two more moderate
members of the court's conservative
wing, who are the perennial swing votes
on the court. They teamed up to
join 5 to 4 conservative majorities 14
times. But in eight other 5 to 4
cases, a winning vote from either
O'Connor or Kennedy went for the
liberals.
By contrast, the liberals attracted one of
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the two swing justices to their side in a 5
to 4 case only once in the term that began
in October 1999, according to figures
compiled by Washington lawyer Tom
Goldstein.
"The term could have been much worse,"
said Elliot Mincberg, vice president and
legal director of the liberal People for the
American Way.
"There were some disappointments," said
Todd Gaziano, director of the Center for
Legal and Judicial Studies at the Heritage
Foundation, a conservative think tank.
One of the court's decisions this term
even raised the intriguing possibility that
next term could bring a victory for
opponents of capital punishment so
substantial that most anti-death penalty
activists once considered it unimaginable:
The court agreed to consider whether
the Constitution prohibits the execution
of mentally retarded criminals, an issue
the court had apparently settled, in the
affirmative, 12 years ago.
A well-publicized story last term was one
that, so far at least, hasn't happened: a
retirement by one or more justices.
Frequent and feverish rumors
notwithstanding, the court's lineup
remained unchanged, with O'Connor, 71,
issuing an unusual public denial of
speculation that she would leave the court.
Still, the frequency with which the court
decided cases by narrow margins this term
-- there was a higher rate of 5 to 4
opinions, 33 percent, this term than in any
other term for the past decade, according
to Goldstein -- underscored for liberal and
conservative activists the importance of
any future appointments President Bush
might be called upon to make if one of
the justices leaves.
For the most part, the court's criminal
cases went against law enforcement
authorities. The justices, demonstrating
skepticism about government methods in
the war on drugs, invalidated an Indiana
program under which police set up
roadblocks and randomly searched
drivers' cars for drugs; struck down a
South Carolina program under which
pregnant mothers were tested for drugs at
a public hospital, with positive
results forwarded to the police; and said
police must get a warrant
before using a thermal imaging device to
detect heat emanating from a
marijuana-growing operation inside a
house.
To be sure, the conservatives continued to
successfully pursue their effort to enhance
states' rights vis-a-vis the federal
government. The most clearly
conservative result this term was the
court's holding that states are immune
from discrimination suits for damages in
federal court by their disabled employees.
It was important not only for its direct
impact on state workers, but also for the
fact that the court brushed
aside detailed findings by Congress
supporting the need for such a
provision in federal law.
"Here you have this huge congressional
record, and the court still struck it down,"
said Steven Shapiro, national legal director
of the American Civil Liberties Union. "It
really left people in a quandary as
to what means there are for federal civil
rights enforcement against state
defendants."
The court also eliminated the legal basis
for a whole category of anti-
discrimination lawsuits that minority
groups had used to challenge
allegedly biased state actions ranging from
certain admissions requirements at
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universities to the placement of polluting
factories near minority neighborhoods.
Another far-reaching conservative result
emerged in a Texas case involving a
mother who was arrested and briefly jailed
by police for not buckling her children's
seat belts while driving through her
suburban neighborhood. The court, by
another 5 to 4 vote, held that the
Constitution permits full custodial arrests
for offenses that are normally punishable
only by a fine.
The majority in that case was an unusual
one, with Souter joining Rehnquist, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas and O'Connor
joining the court's other liberals in a
dissenting opinion. The dissenters said the
ruling could weaken the public's
protections against police abuses such as
racial profiling.
And the court said employers may require
employees to submit their discrimination
complaints to an arbitrator rather than sue
in court.
On the environment, the conservatives
also trimmed the scope of protection.
They held that the Clean Water Act does
not authorize the federal government to
regulate self-contained ponds located
within a single state and not clearly linked
to the country's broader network of
streams and lakes. They also granted
property owners greater latitude to
sue for damages when they claim that
state environmental regulation has
reduced the value of their property.
But in at least the clean water case, the
court declined to adopt a broader
proposed view of the case that would
have held that Congress lacked
constitutional authority to regulate such
water generally.
Then, in the Clean Air Act case, the
court's liberals and conservatives
united to ward off an ambitious business-
led attack that sought to overturn the
EPA's authority to regulate certain air
pollutants on the grounds that the agency
had not been specifically authorized to do
so by Congress. Scalia wrote the opinion.
However, in one respect that case may
have been the exception that
proves an increasingly evident rule about
the court.
Liberal and conservative justices share a
propensity to substitute their judgment for
that of Congress, lower courts, federal
agencies and state governments.
Even when a conservative majority
dismissed Congress's findings about
state discrimination against the disabled in
deciding that the disability rights law did
not overcome states' sovereign imunity
to discrimination suits, the effect was as
much to aggrandize the court's
power vis-a-vis that of Congress as it was
to enhance state power against the federal
government.
And just as the conservatives trumped
Congress in that case, liberals
ruled in crucial immigration cases that
laws written by Congress that were
ambiguous but seemed to preclude federal
court intervention on behalf of deportable
aliens did not, in fact, do so.
As a result, immigrants may now have
access to federal courts to dispute their
deportation orders, and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service has lost the
authority to detain certain aliens
indefinitely pending their deportation to
countries that resist taking them back.
Instead, the immigrants can seek release in
court, according to a new set of rules,
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drawn up by the justices, that tend to
favor immigrants more than the earlier
rules.
In the Casey Martin case, an ambitious
opinion written by Stevens dismissed the
professional golf tour's claim that it
should be able to decide all the rules of its
tournaments, asserting instead that federal
courts could evaluate when an
accommodation for a disabled athlete
might or might not constitute a
"fundamental" change in the game.
Thus, the common element linking Bush
v. Gore to many other cases this
term was that it, too, amounted to a
declaration by the court that it
was better positioned than a lower state
court or Congress to decide how
-- or if -- ballots in Florida should be
counted.
"The court assumes that it is more
qualified than Congress to resolve
disputed electoral votes, more entitled
than the president's agencies to
fill gaps in federal law and better equipped
than the professional golf association to
determine the rules of golf," said Walter
Dellinger, a Washington lawyer who
served as solicitor general under President
Bill Clinton.
Copyright 0 2001 The Washington Pst
Company.
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At the end of a long and pleasant lunch at
the Supreme Court recently, Justice David
Souter paused and told an old friend: "I'm
very grateful that we didn't talk about Bah
v Gow."
Souter's comment, recounted by the
justice's lunch companion on the
condition of anonymity, offers a glimpse
into the Supreme Court's term that ended
last week. There was Buh v Goe -- the
Dec. 12 opinion that resolved the Florida
post-election recount dispute in favor of
George W. Bush -- and then there was
everything else.
The justices would just as soon not think
or talk about Bush v Gor anymore, though
they have apparently reached the stage
where they can laugh about it. At the law
clerks' annual invitation- only show for the
justices on June 26, the case was the target
of several send-ups.
"After Bush v Gom, they rolled up their
sleeves and worked hard to put it behind
them," says Drake University law
Professor Thomas Baker, once an aide to
Chief Justice William Rehnquist. "Now, I
think there's a surreality to the case in
their eyes. It's almost like it wasn't this
term, not even this Court."
Like it or not, however, Bush v Gor, No.
00-949, did emanate from this Court this
term. The first wave of book-length
analyses of the case has emerged, with
Alan Dershowitz and Vincent Bugliosi
portraying it as a lawless and aberrant




But, at the same time, other scholars and
analysts are trying to stitch Buh v Gore
back into the fabric of the Rehnquist
Court -- to see how it fits in with the
Court's overall direction.
What's emerging is a consensus: Buh u
Gom does fit into the broader patterns --
but only if the Court is viewed, not as a
states' rights Court, or a Court that takes a
narrow view of constitutional rights, but
as a judicial supremacy Court, a Court that
takes no guff from the other branches. It's
a Court, in other words, bold enough to
intervene in the messes the other
institutions of government get themselves
into, and self-confident enough to think it
knows best how to fix them.
"This is the least deferential Supreme
Court in American history," says former
acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger,
now national chairman of the appellate
practice at OMelveny & Myers. "The
theme of the last five years is not
federalism but judicial supremacy."
Adds University of Virginia law professor
A.E. Dick Howard: "I continue to be
awed at the willingness of the Supreme
Court to step into matters that Felix
Frankfurter would never have gotten into.
This term shows that to be conservative is
not to be lacking in self-confidence."
Frankfurter was a leading proponent of
judicial restraint.
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THE RULE OF LAW
Whether this boldness looks good or bad
depends on the beholder's political bent.
Douglas Kmiec, a former Reagan Justice
Department aide and incoming dean of
Catholic University of America's
Columbus School of Law, sees the Court's
term, including Bush v Core, as a "triumph
of law over politics." He explains, "It
nourishes the notion of a rule of law,
because it says there are some things best
resolved by a group of people who are
independent, with life tenure and
undiminished salaries."
Kmiec also thinks the Court did not make
a power grab in the election case, but
accepted the "unsought responsibility" of
resolving the mess. But to Erwin
Chemerinsky, law professor at the
University of Southern California, the
Court's assertiveness heralds "a new era of
the imperial judiciary."
That new era may have reached its apex in
Bush u Gore, but it actually got started
several years ago.
A Supreme Court that once touted its
desire to recede from the spotlight began
grabbing it with its cases cutting back
congressional commerce clause power in
Unid States v Lopez, the 1995 ruling that
rejected the Gun-Free School Zones Act,
and continuing through last year's United
States v Monson, striking down parts of
the Violence Against Women Act. In City
jfBoerne v Flons, the Court in 1997 said
Congress had no business passing laws --
in that case, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act -- that interpret the
Constitution.
Drake's Baker calls it "judicial hubris,
something they have in common with the
Warren Court -- an abiding belief that
they know better."
Whatever you call it, the trend appears to
have blossomed across the landscape this
term. The same Court that made short
shrift of the ability of the Florida Supreme
Court -- or Congress for that matter -- to
resolve the 2000 presidential election has
elbowed aside a wide range of institutions
in other decisions this term.
Those that bore the brunt of the Court's
power display this term included:
* the voters of California, who decided by
a 56 percent majority that seriously ill
people who would benefit from using
marijuana for medicinal purposes should
be allowed to do so (Unital Staes u
Chkland Cannabis Bjens' Cxperatiw, No.
00- 15 1);
* administrative agencies, whose low-level
decisions, such as classification rulings by
the U.S. Customs Service, were once
accorded so-called Chwern deference
(Umtal Stats v Mead Cap., No. 99-1434);
* jurors who return big punitive damages
verdicts (Coper Industies Inc v Leadxmnn






that want to coordinate
with their candidates
omission v Cdora do
Canpaign Omnitte, No.
* and even the Professional Golfers
Association, on the nature of the game
(PGA Tour v Manin, No. 00-24).
Of course, it was Congress that ended up
on the receiving end with great frequency.
The justices struck down laws that tried to
restrict immigrants rights (Ashcrf v Ma,
No. 00-38, and Zadydas v Dais, No. 99-
38
7791, and cano-Maniirz v Inmugration
ard Naturalization Serue, No. 00- 1011, and
Inmgration and Naturalization Serie v St
Cyr, No. 00-767); muzzle legal services
lawyers (Legl Sermcs Corp. v Vdazquez,
No. 99-603); punish the disclosure of
eavesdropped telephone conversations
(Bartniki v Vopper, No 99-1687); protect
disabled state workers (Baed j Tnstas f
the Uniwsity qAtlam u Ganett, No. 99-
1240); and promote the cleanliness of
ponds (Sdlid Waste Agrry oNoathem Coe
Caarty v US. Amy Corps jEngitm, No.
99-1178.)
The Court was not in a defiant mood in
every decision this term. The case
involving the Federal Election
Commission can be viewed as a bow to
congressional campaign finance reform
efforts. In another case involving
government rules, Wlhitmn v Anrrican
Tndin Assonatiom, No. 99-1257,
Congress and the Environmental
Protection Agency won at least a partial
victory on setting air quality standards.
The North Carolina legislature also finally
won some respect for its redistricting
efforts (Huntv Crrnmtie, No. 99-1864).
The Supreme Court also did not step up
to the plate every time its intervention was
sought. It passed on the Microsoft
antitrust litigation, though it could find its
way back. And just last week it declined to
hear Hopmi v Teras, the long-running
case on affirmative action in higher
education -- though that issue, too, will be
hard for the Supreme Court to avoid in
other cases next term.
The justices also made a mark by siding
with criminal defendants in a spate of
cases upholding the search warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
In Kyo v Unital State, No. 99-8508, the
Court drew a technological line against
thermal imaging devices and other police
tools that pierce the privacy of a home. In
Indianapdis v Edmr( No. 99-1030, and
Feguson v City f Cadriton, No. 99-936,
the Court disapproved of police programs
that searched cars and pregnant women,
respectively, for illegal drugs.
An expansive view of the Fourth
Amendment did not extend, however, to
Atwater v Lago Vista, No. 99-1408, in
which the Court said people could be
arrested for minor offenses that are
punished with only a fine.
In five separate decisions, the Supreme
Court also continued its embrace of
arbitration as an alternative to litigation.
And in its most important church-state
case of the term, Good Nezus Cub v Milfoni
Cetral Sdxd, No. 99-2036, the Court said
a Bible club could not be deemed too
religious to meet on public school
grounds. It could bode well for the Bush
administration in future battles over
school vouchers and faith-based
initiatives.
The Court continued to be sharply
divided, voting 5-4 in 26 of 85 cases
during the term, with Justices Anthony
Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor
playing their usual role as crucial swing
votes.
That closeness and unpredictability made
it hard for practitioners and scholars to
see consistent themes this term.
"There are no principles, no trends, just
ad hoc opinions," says Michael Carvin, a
partner in the Washington, D.C, office of
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.
Carvin cited the FEC case, Bannidei, and
Uniad State v Unteil Fods, No. 00-276,
which struck down a federal program that
compelled mushroom growers to pay for
generic advertising.
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"The Court is protecting mushroom
growers' speech in UnitadFods, and stolen
speech in Bantnidei, but not the core
speech of political parties in FEC," says
Carvin.
A CASE FOR THE AGES
But no matter what else the Court did in
the term that ended on June 28, Bush u
Gore will dominate the history books. But
for now, the justices are doing all they can
to discourage discussion of what went on
inside the building during the post-
election litigation. Nonetheless, stories are
seeping out. One involves a clerk, his
wife, and basketball at the nation's highest
court.
Jonathan Cohn, a clerk to Justice Clarence
Thomas, might have felt like the only
person in Washington not consumed by
the case. His wife, Rachel Brand, now an
assistant White House counsel, was then a
lawyer at Cooper, Carvin & Rosenthal and
part of the Bush legal team in the Florida
courts.
Because of her role in the litigation, Cohn
recused himself from any involvement in
the intense research and opinion-writing
at the Court for the Florida cases. On the
day Bush v Gore was handed down, the
story goes, Cohn sent an e-mail to fellow
clerks to see if anyone wanted to play
basketball on the court inside the Supreme
Court building. Cohn couldn't find any
takers among exhausted clerks, who
razzed him in a flurry of e-mails.
Contacted last week, Brand said she and
her husband were "very careful" to avoid
conflicts by staying away from all aspects
of the Supreme Court litigation. She
would not confirm the basketball story,
but did allow that Cohn "may have been
twiddling his thumbs" that fateful day.
Copyright * 2001 NLP IP Company
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The Separation of Justice and State
The New York Times
Sunday, July 1, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
There is a paradox that the recent
Supreme Court term the term that saw the
court decide a presidential election -- cast
into high relief: rarely has the Supreme
Court been as deeply embroiled in the
political life of the country and rarely, if
ever, have the justices themselves been so
removed from the craft of politics.
From its earliest days, the court included
members of Congress, cabinet officers
and others drawn from the front ranks of
public life. Consider that 80 years ago, a
former president, William Howard Taft,
began a tenure as chief justice. But though
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor is a former
state legislator, no current justice has held
elective federal office or even a high
appointed one.
Conversely, prior judicial experience was
long considered irrelevant for service on
the Supreme Court. For example, the
early Warren Court included three former
senators, two former attorneys general
and Earl Warren himself, three-time
governor of California and the
Republican's vice presidential nominee in
1948. But all the current justices were
judges when appointed, except Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist, who was an
assistant attorney general in the Nixon
administration.
The result has been to transform the court
from an institution that once drew on the
collective experience of people who had
lived both sides of the vital intersection of
law and politics -- where the most
important cases arise -- to one staffed by a
smart, highly professional cadre of
academic judges who ' often appear
disconnected from the practical
implications of the court's work.
Something has been gained, certainly- a
fluidity with legal doctrine in its many
nuances. But something vital has been lost
-- a framework for seeing the world in all
its gritty reality from inside the marble
cocoon. It is hard to imagine, for example,
that justices with substantial political
experience would blithely assume that
defending against the Paula Corbin Jones
sexual harassment suit would not be a
burden for Bill Clinton.
What is the current court missing without
political biographies? Some justices today
see Congress as alien if not enemy
territory. A former member of Congress
could be a useful translator of the
Congressional mind, much as Justice
O'Connor, who served in the Arizona
State Senate, has been for the states'
interests.
To cite an example from the term just
over, justices with political experience
might not have declared, as the majority
did in a decision limiting the states'
exposure to suits under the Amencans
With Disabilities Act, that despite holding
12 hearings over three years Congress had
failed to prove state governments had a
history of discriminating against people
with disabilities.
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The absence of any retirement
announcements as the court recessed
Thursday means the bitter ideological
debate certain to surround President
Bush's effort to fill the next vacancy is
some months or years away. So it is a
good time to step back and consider the
court from the perspective not of ideology
but biography.
From any angle, this is a far different
court from the one filled by the politicians
of a generation ago, whose judicial
horizons stretched as far as those of the
postwar country itself. The leading
members of the Warren Court were
"larger than life," said Lucas A. Powe Jr., a
law professor at the University of Texas
and the author of the recent book, "The
Warren Court and American Politics"
(Belknap, 2000), and they regarded the
court as a canvas on which to paint on a
grand scale. Not only Warren but William
0. Douglas, a key member of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's brain trust and
the head of his Securities and Exchange
Commission, and Hugo L. Black, the
Senate floor manager for much of the
New Deal, had been considered as
potential presidential candidates. "It
mattered a lot that these were savvy
politicians," Professor Powe said.
Professor Powe said that while the
Warren Court is often characterized as
having been "counter-majoritarian,"
forcing on a reluctant public its own
vision of what was right but unachievable
through democratic politics, this is a
misunderstanding. "It was actually very
majoritarian," he said. "They removed the
blocks to majority rule that were lurking
within the system," like the
malapportioned legislatures that fell to the
Warren Court's one-person, one-vote
decisions. "They knew what was majority
sentiment and what wasn't."
But indisputably, the Warren era
provoked a strong reaction. "The
technocrats we've acquired since then are
somewhat a reaction to what the Warren
Court did, and to the feeling that if we can
just pick very safe people, they won't do
it," Professor Powe said.
THERE are more generous ways to
characterize the current justices than as
technocrats. No one could doubt their
intelligence or legal skills. "The Warren
Court needed legal craftsmen and the
present court is far more adept at legal
craftsmanship," said Walter E. Dellinger, a
law professor now in private practice who
served as acting solicitor general during
the Clinton administration. He was one of
several advisers who urged President
Clinton to resurrect the tradition of
picking justices from public life. The
president did consider Mario M. Cuomo,
the former New York governor, George J.
Mitchell, the former Senate majority
leader, and Bruce Babbitt, a former
Arizona governor then in the cabinet, for
the vacancies that went to Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
"I said when Thurgood Marshall retired
that the court had lost its only -- " Mr.
Dellinger said, "and people expected me
to say 'black justice.' But what I said was
'national figure.' The present court could
use one, someone with real-life
experience."
Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr., who had
headed the Richmond, Va., school board
during the tense years of desegregation,
was one example Mr. Dellinger cited.
"Powell had a real sense of the way the
world works," he said. "The court needs a
mix of pragmatists and of those moved by
abstract principle. The biggest mistake a
president can make is to name the same
kind of person over and over."
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Diversity in the broadest sense is a goal
often cited by those who study the court.
"It was great to have one Bill Douglas on
the court, but you wouldn't want nine of
them," said Dennis J. Hutchinson, a law
professor at the University of Chicago and
a former law clerk to both Justice Douglas
and Justice Byron R. White. Justice
Douglas's "mercurial intelligence was
better suited to starting an argument," Mr.
Hutchinson said, "than to doing the tough
day-to-day work of the institution."
Having veterans of high elective office on
the court, he said in an interview, "would
give texture to what are otherwise some
rather flat and sterile academic debates"
over questions like what use to make of
legislative history in interpreting statutes.
A former legislator "could bring a
perspective on what often looks to the
court like the irrational nature of
legislation," Mr. Hutchinson said.
Justices with broad previous experience
have often emerged as influential
members of the court. Consider the great
chief justice John Marshall, who served in
Congress and was secretary of state under
John Adams; and Charles Evans Hughes,
who twice moved from electoral politics
to the court. He was a two-term governor
of New York when he was named to the
court in 1910, left to run for president on
the Republican ticket and rejoined as chief
justice in 1930.
The effect of a skilled politician on the
court can be powerful. Brown v. Board of
Education had originally been argued in
1953, but the justices were deeply divided
and could not coalesce around a decision.
The case was scheduled for a second
argument just as Earl Warren was named
chief justice. The former governor was
able to draw on his arsenal of political
skills, largely reframing the argument so
that other justices would agree on it, until
he achieved unanimity for the decision.
PEOPLE who say the court is seriously
out of touch with the real world invariably
cite Clinton v. Jones, the 1997 decision in
which all nine justices rejected President
Clinton's request for temporary immunity
from the Paula Jones lawsuit. The justices'
confidence that the case could be easily
managed by a sitting president now seems
cavalier, even ludicrous. Even those who
see it as legally correct -- and many do --
think that justices with government
experience would have been less
dismissive of the president's concerns.
On the other hand, times have changed in
the law as in the country, and real-world
experience may not be the talisman it
once was. "The law has gotten so
complicated that it's a more theoretical
and complex job than it used to be," Mr.
Hutchinson said.
Inevitably, any justice is the product of
past experience, which may reveal itself in
surprising ways. Before he joined the
court in 1962, Byron White worked in
Robert F. Kennedy's Justice Department
as deputy attorney general, and he went to
Alabama to deploy federal marshals to
protect the Freedom Riders. It proved a
formative experience for the crusty
conservative, who in his 31 years on the
court was never to forsake his
commitment to civil rights nor his view
that a strong national government was
essential, positions struggling to hold their
own on the current court. Justice White
dissented from both Miranda v. Arizona
and Roe v. Wade, but on federal authority
he was with the liberals, Mr. Dellinger
noted: "When he thought of states' rights,
he saw George Wallace in the
schoolhouse door."
Copyright @ 2001 The New York Tirras
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Disrobed! Actually, They Think for Themselves
The Washington Post
Sunday, July 1, 2001
Richard W. Gamett
It's probably unavoidable that the
Supreme Court term that ended last
week will be defined in most people's
minds by a single dominant image. Who
could ever forget the surreal scene that
unfolded simultaneously on the court
steps and on millions of TV screens a
little after 10 p.m. last Dec. 12, when the
justices released their decision in Bush v.
Gore?
But the danger is that the focus on that
decision -- so frequently derided as
partisan -- raises another, cartoon-like
image of the court: that of a marble
facade behind which disciplined factions
of squishy liberals and hardhearted
conservatives wage war over hot-button
issues, while a handful of thoughtful
moderates anguishes over which side to
join.
Cases would be simple in a cartoon court
like that. But real cases, like real life, are
more complicated.
This Supreme Court term revealed that
our justices are neither easy to pigeonhole
nor easy to predict. Their dispositions are
not merely "restrained" or "activist." Their
decisions aren't predetermined by the
ideological labels slapped on by partisan
animators. Over this past year, they did
what they always do: They worked hard to
decide difficult cases. And in numerous
instances, the results were far removed
from what the "law and order versus
bleeding heart" paradigm would lead us to
expect.
This reality came through clearly in cases
involving the justices' application of
judicial tools, methods and dispositions
sometimes labeled "conservative" by
politicians and commentators: a focus on
the Framers' intent, an effort to identify
the original meaning of the Constitution's
text and a respect for deeply rooted legal
traditions. In Kyllo v. United States, for
instance, a sharply divided court held 5 to
4 that a police practice of using a
"thermal-imaging device" to detect heat
emanating from a suspect's house in order
to determine whether marijuana was being
grown inside was a "search" of that
person's home within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and therefore almost
certainly required a warrant.
It should be easy to predict the votes of
the cartoon court in a case like this: The
lock-'em-up "conservatives" (Chief Justice
William Rehnquist joined by Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas)
would vote to smooth the way for
government drug warriors, while the soft-
on-crime "liberals" (Justices John Paul
Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen
Breyer and David Souter) would take a
stand for privacy, liberty and maybe even
a little personal experimentation. In
fact, though, the arch-conservative
cartoon villain Scalia, joined by Thomas
and liberals Ginsburg and Souter, wrote
the majority opinion upholding the
sanctity and privacy of the home and
protecting it from high-tech government
snooping, over the dissent of the often
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lonely liberal Justice Stevens, who was
joined by the "swing" justices, Anthony
Kennedy and Sandra Day O'Connor.
So what happened? Did Justices Scalia and
Thomas lose the script?
No. The same judicial tools and
philosophical commitments that so often
attract knee-jerk labels like "conservative"
compelled Scalia and Thomas to the
"liberal" result in Kyllo. The text of the
Constitution, after all, clearly guarantees
the right to "be secure in [our] houses"
from "unreasonable searches and
seizures." This, for a conservative like
Scalia, is not a right that should wax and
wane with the times and technology.
Scalia was not out to unearth new rights in
a "living" Constitution. It is a deeply
rooted principle of Anglo-American law
and tradition that the privacy of the home
is protected against government intrusion.
Scalia's purpose was, as he put it, to
preserve "that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted."
Rogers v. Tennessee was another
surprise to those who subscribe to the
image of the cartoon court. Wilbert
Rogers had been convicted of murder
when the man he had stabbed died after
15 months in a coma. As Rogers's
lawyers pointed out to the Tennessee
courts, however, the traditional criminal-
law rule -- and the rule in Tennessee at
the time -- was that no one could be
convicted of murder unless his victim
died within "a year and a day." (This rule
made sense when life was precarious,
medical care spotty at best and forensic
pathology little more than guesswork)
The Tennessee court acknowledged the
rule but then discarded it as outdated (as
most states had already done), and
affirmed Rogers's murder
conviction.
Again, we might have expected in Rogers
a typecast 5 to 4 split between left and
right. Instead, Justices Souter and
Ginsburg joined with Rehnquist, Kennedy
and O'Connor to affirm the conviction.
Scalia, on the other hand -- again joined
by Thomas, but also by the more liberal
justices Breyer and Stevens -- insisted that
the Constitution did not permit, because
the Framers would not have permitted,
the Tennessee courts to so dramatically
change the rules of the game in the course
of a criminal case. it is, Scalia wrote, one
of the most "widely held value-
judgmentfs] in the entire history of human
thought" -- and one incorporated into our
Constitution at the founding -- that a
court "cannot make murder what was not
murder when the act was committed."
Another noteworthy instance of a justice
throwing out the cartoon court's
ideological playbook was Breyer's vote in
Good News Cub v. Milford Central
School, a First Amendment case. As he
had in last year's Mitchell v. Helms --
where the court held that the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause
permitted governments to help students
by loaning educational materials and
equipment to private and religious schools
-- Breyer again parted company with his
liberal strict separationist colleagues. He
joined Thomas's majority opinion stating
that the First Amendment does not
permit a public school to discriminate
against a student group on the basis of its
religious activities and expression.
If other private groups are permitted to
meet after hours on school
grounds, these two supposed opponents
agreed, then the Constitution neither
requires nor permits government officials
to single out religious groups for
unfavorable treatment.
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The Good News decision not only takes
us beyond the caricatures, like Kyllo and
Rogers. It also provides additional support
for efforts to increase parental choice in
education by allowing low-income parents
in failing districts to choose religious
schools for their children and for
proposals to better serve people in need
of social and other services by permitting
religious groups to provide government-
funded assistance. More generally,
Breyer's votes in Mitchell and Good News
illustrate the growing acceptance of the
view -- one the partisan cartoon would tag
as "conservative" -- that the Constitution
prohibits government establishment of
religion in order to protect religious
freedom, but does not require
government to sweep religious expression
and activity from public life.
Finally, probably no justice has been more
often caricatured -- whether out of cruelty,
condescension, ignorance or good-faith
disagreement -- than Clarence Thomas.
More and more, though, thoughtful
observers and scholars of all political
stripes are taking notice of his well-
crafted, rigorous and challenging opinions.
Not only did he author the lead opinions
in Mitchell and Good News Club, he also
issued provocative separate opinions m a
number of other First Amendment cases.
In FEC v. Colorado Republican, he led
the four dissenters, arguing powerfully
that however you dress them up,
restrictions on political parties' efforts to
support their preferred candidates cut to
the heart of the rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment. Along the way, he got
in one of the term's best lines, expressing
"baffle[ment]" that "this Court has
extended the most generous First
Amendment safeguards to filing lawsuits,
wearing profane jackets, and exhibiting
drive-in movies with nudity, but has
offered only tepid protection to the core
speech and associational rights that our
Founders sought to defend."
And in a concurring opinion in Lorillard
Tobacco v. Reilly, the tobacco-advertising
case decided on the last day of the term,
he continued his efforts to afford
commercial speech the full protection
that, in his view, the First Amendment
requires. (It's worth noting, as long as
we're debunking stereotypes, that Thomas
has frequently been joined in this effort by
"liberal" Justices Ginsburg and Stevens.)
Now, there's no denying that stories of
partisan justices, scheming law clerks and
a court ripped apart by culture wars make
for good copy. And like any caricature, the
cartoon that results is not entirely
inaccurate: Roadrunners don't actually
burn up desert highways, either, chased by
coyotes on Acme rockets, but they are
pretty speedy little birds. It's true that the
court decides many close and difficult
cases -- if they were easy, after all, they
would not end up in the Supreme Court.
It's true that one can identify "blocs" of
philosophically simpatico justices; that
some lean left while others lean right; and
that, in many close cases, the swing votes
of Justices O'Connor or Kennedy
determine the outcome. It's also true,
though, that the court is unanimous, or
nearly so, far more often than it is
ideologically splintered.
In the end, Bush v. Gore notwithstanding,
the court is more of a good-faith
intellectual community than a fever
swamp of ideological intrigue. That's the
image -- not the cartoon -- we should
keep in mind
Copyright © 2001 The Washington Post
Company
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With Conservative Edge, High Court Cuts a 'Wide Swath Law: Justices
End Term Highlighted by Bush v. Gore but Sprinkled with Far-
reaching Decisions
Los Angeles Times
Sunday, July 1, 2001
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court term that ended last
week showed again that the justices are
not shy about imposing their will--
whether it is deciding a presidential
election, managing the use of public
school buildings or even determining the
rules of professional golf.
They are known as the "Supremes" in
Washington, and for good reason.
Confident of their abilities and
determined to have the last word on the
law, the justices rarely defer to the
decisions of others.
Their boldness and decisiveness was on
display in this term's most memorable
case, Bush vs. Gore.
On a Saturday in mid-December, the
court on a 5-4 vote issued an emergency
order to stop a statewide hand recount
of presidential votes in Florida. And late
the following Tuesday, the court issued
an unsigned opinion, accompanied by
four dissents, that said the recount was
unconstitutional and could not continue,
effectively making George W. Bush the
presidential winner over Al Gore.
While these decisions will be long
debated, the court's handling of the case
highlights two trends on display
throughout the year.
One is judicial assertiveness, a
willingness to intervene and reverse
decisions made at other levels of
government.
The second is ideological. On matters
that divide liberals and conservatives,
Chief Justice William H Rehnquist
continues to be able to muster a narrow
conservative majority. He can almost
always rely on Justices Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas, and usually on
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and
Anthony M. Kennedy.
Besides the Florida case, these justices
voted together in 14 other disputes that
ended in 5-4 decisions. In these rulings,
for example, the court declared that:
* Congress cannot protect state
employees with disabilities from job
discrimination. The decision in Alabama
vs. Garrett rejected a discrimination
claim brought by a nursing supervisor
who was demoted after she was treated
for breast cancer. States have a
"sovereign immunity" that shields them
from suits, the court said.
* Federal environmental regulators
cannot protect isolated wetlands and
ponds. The Clean Water Act does not
reach these inland waters, it said.
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* The Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not
authorize lawsuits from blacks, Latinos
or minontes over policies of states,
schools, colleges or the police that have a
discriminatory effect on them. The law
covers only claims of intentional
discrimination, it said.
* Local school officials cannot close their
buildings to Bible study groups if others
are allowed to meet there. Religious
groups have a free speech right to be
included, it said.
* State and local officials may not restrict
the advertising of cigarettes to shield
children. The 1st Amendment protects
the right to advertise, it said.
Years ago, conservatives complained
about the court's liberal activism and its
willingness to oversee how police
questioned suspects, how schools dealt
with prayer and how states administered
the death penalty.
These days, the court has become more
conservative, but several of these rulings
suggest that judicial activism has not
waned.
"It's true across the board. [The justices]
don't defer to anyone," said former U.S.
Solicitor General Walter E. Dellinger.
The court's more liberal members did
score some important victories during
the term. Indeed, the court turned an
increasingly skeptical eye on several laws
that had been passed by a Republican-
controlled Congress.
In 1996, GOP-backed legislation barred
legal aid lawyers from going to court to
challenge welfare reform laws. But on a
5-4 vote this year, the court tossed out
this restriction as unconstitutional.
Kennedy cast the key vote by joining the
liberal coalition of John Paul Stevens,
David H Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg
and Stephen G. Breyer.
O'Connor joined this bloc in a North
Carolina case to give states more leeway
to cluster black voters in Democratic-
leaning electoral districts. So long as
districts are redrawn for political reasons,
not racial ones, they are constitutional,
the court said.
And on a 6-3 decision--with O'Connor,
Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer in the majority--the court limited
the power of police in the war on drugs,
striking down the use of roadblocks
aimed solely at searching for narcotics.
Even the rule makers in pro sports were
not beyond the court's reach. On a 7- 2
vote, the justices told PGA Tour Inc.
that it must allow disabled golfer Casey
Martin to ride in a cart so that he can
compete in a tournament.
Last week, the immigration reform laws
of 1996 came under attack.
Kennedy joined with the liberal group to
rule that the courthouse is not closed to
legal immigrants facing deportation
because of a criminal record. The
Republican Congress had voted to make
such deportations virtually automatic,
even for those immigrants whose crime
was a minor theft or the sale of a small
amount of drugs.
Two principles were at issue in the
immigration cases. First, federal officials
have broad authority over the
immigrants. But second, the federaljudiciary--and ultimately the Supreme
Court--has the power to decide matters
concerning constitutional rights.
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The Republican Congress went a bit too
far, even for a conservative-leaning
court, by declaring that "no court shall
have the jurisdiction to review any final
order of removal" for an immigrant
criminal.
This declaration waved a red flag in front
of the justices, who think they have the
final word on the law. And not
surprisingly, they struck it down.
Still, the practical effect of the
immigration ruling is likely to be limited.
In its ruling, the high court said that
immigrants whose crimes occurred
before 1996 can still seek a waiver of
deportation from the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. But this ruling
did not alter the law for those who
committed crimes since 1996. They may
file a writ of habeas corpus in a federal
court, but they have little grounds for
winning their claims.
Some immigrant rights lawyers said they
feared the high court's rulings would be
seen wrongly as major victories.
"This decision was great for a limited
class of people, those who pleaded guilty
before 1996. It doesn't really do anything
for those whose cases came after 1996,"
said Manuel Vargas, who heads the
immigrant rights project for the New
York State Defenders Assn. "The law is
very harsh for those people, and this
doesn't change it. Only new legislation
can change it."
Three rulings last week on advertising
and free speech left 1st Amendment
scholars perplexed.
"They don't know how to deal with the
role of money and speech, and the
decisions are incoherent," said
Northwestern University law professor
Martin Redish.
The advertising disputes involved
cigarette makers, mushroom growers and
political parties.
The cigarette makers won a free-speech
ruling that knocks down local and state
advertising restrictions, and the
mushroom growers won the right to
refuse to pay for generic ads promoting
the virtues of their product.
But the political parties lost their claimed
1st Amendment right to spend freely to
advertise the virtues of their candidates.
Inconsistency aside, the conservative
justices these days vote more often in
favor of free speech claims, said UCLA
law professor Eugene Volokh. He has
tracked 1st Amendment cases for seven
years, and he said Kennedy, an appointee
of President Reagan, votes most often
for free speech. Next in line are Thomas
and Souter.
Breyer, a Clinton appointee, votes least
often in support of free speech.
Also unpredictable is the court's lineup
on cases involving the 4th Amendment
and its ban on "unreasonable searches
and seizures."
In May, Souter allied himself with the
conservative bloc in a decision that
explored the "nightwalker" statutes of
the Middle Ages, as well as the
"vagabond" laws brought to the
American Colonies from England. In
writing the majority opinion, Souter
concluded that the 4th Amendment was
not intended to restrict the power of
authorities to arrest a person who was
seen committing an offense in public, no
matter how minor. Therefore, a Texas
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police officer did not violate the 4th
Amendment when he arrested a mother
and took her to jail for not wearing her
seat belt.
But a few weeks ago, Scalia wrote a
liberal-sounding majority opinion joined
by Souter. They concluded the 4th
Amendment as originally written was
intended to protect the privacy of
homes. And therefore it was
unconstitutional for the police to scan a
home with a heat detector in search of a
hothouse for growing marijuana.
In dissent, Stevens and O'Connor
wondered how it could be reasonable to
seize a person for not wearing a seat belt
but unreasonable to use a scanner on a
public street.
O'Connor's dissents are rare, however,
and she figures to hold the key vote on
three major issues coming before the
court next term.
The justices will decide whether mentally
retarded defendants can be executed and
whether the federal government can use
affirmative action policies when
awarding contracts. The third case,
pending appeal, will test whether states
can give tax-funded vouchers to parents
to send their children to religious
schools.
Copyright 0 2001 The Times Mirror
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In Year of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much Other Work
The New York Times
Monday, July 2, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
The year the court picked the president:
the Supreme Court's 2000-2001 term will
always be known as that, and
undoubtedly, in the view of many people,
it will be remembered for that
extraordinary event alone.
But there were many other elements to
the term, and many lenses through which
to view the 79 decisions the court issued.
Through one lens, the term was a
fascinating report card of sorts on how
the two elected branches of government
behaved during a previous election year,
1996, when conservatives in Congress
were in the ascendancy and Democrats
were on the defensive on a range of issues
bearing on crime, immigration and social
policy. Bills passed that year and signed
into law by President Bill Clinton have
spawned a great deal of litigation, with
several cases reaching the court this term.
Over the last several years, including this
term, the court has upheld most
restrictions the 1996 Congress placed on
the ability of prison inmates to gain access
to court. That is not surprising, because
the 1996 legislation in effect codified a
number of the Rehnquist Court's own
initiatives, which reduced federal court
jurisdiction over cases brought by state
pnsoners.
But the justices' response to the 1996
immigration laws was different,
significantly so. In two decisions this term,
a narrow majority viewed laws that cut
back on immigrants' ability to challenge
deportation and detention policies as a
threat to the principle that the
Constitution protects noncitizens as well
as citizens. The court curbed the reach of
the 1996 legislation and refused to give
the traditional judicial deference to
inmigration policies adopted by the
executive branch.
Examining another portion of the 1996
legacy, new restrictions on the ability of
lawyers paid with federal money to
provide legal services to poor clients, the
court ruled that restrictions on the type of
arguments that the lawyers could make in
welfare cases violated the First
Amendment.
Through another lens, the term was a
continuation of the Supreme Court's
federalism revolution, arguably the most
consequential development in
constitutional law of the last decade. By
the same 5-to-4 vote by which it has
decided half a dozen related cases, the
court ruled that Congress did not have the
constitutional authority to open state
governments to lawsuits by their
employees for violations of the Americans
With Disabilities Act.
The decision in Board of Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett reflected
a sharply narrowed view of Congress's
power to enact legislation to enforce the
14th Amendment's guarantee of equal
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protection. Even more than the earlier
decisions, it raised the question of how far
the court was prepared to go in curtailing
the authority of Congress to make
national policy binding on the states.
As it has every term since the mid- 1990's,
the court invalidated at least parts of
several federal statutes. This term, it
rejected the provision of the disability law
the court addressed in the Garrett case;
the restriction on welfare suits in the legal
services law; a law requiring mushroom
producers to pay for a government-
sponsored program that advertises
mushrooms; and a provision of the
federal wiretap law under which the press
could be found liable for publishing
intercepted material.
Through still another lens, the term
offered evidence that even some of the
more conservative justices were beginning
to share the public's discomfort with the
privacy implications of some current law
enforcement strategies. The court found
unconstitutional the warrantless use of
thermal imaging devices that can detect
patterns of heat emerging from private
homes; police roadblocks that use trained
dogs to sniff cars for illegal drugs; and
secret drug tests on unconsenting
pregnant women seeking care at a public
hospital.
On the other hand, the court gave the
police broad discretion to make full
custodial arrests, with the consequent
power to conduct searches, for minor
offenses.
The term was also notable for what did
not happen. In a campaign finance case
from Colorado, the court did not
repudiate its long-held view that tight
limits on campaign contributions do not
violate the First Amendment. In a tobacco








The court turned down two cases raising
constitutional questions about affirmative
action in public university admissions --
an issue that nonetheless appears to be
heading inexorably for a place on the
court's docket within the next term or
two.
Despite seven years without a change of
membership on the court -- the longest
such period since the 1820's -- and despite
feverish speculation, no one retired.
During the term that began last Oct. 2 and
concluded on June 28, the court received
about 7,700 new cases and agreed to
decide 99. It issued 79 decisions (with the
remaining cases to be argued and decided
in the next term), up slightly from the 73
decisions in the previous term but many
fewer than the 150 or so that the court
routinely decided in the 1980's.
Voting statistics provide a window on the
court's divisions, which are at once more
stark and more malleable than they might
appear. Twenty-six of the 79 cases, or 33
percent, were decided by votes of 5 to 4,
the highest proportion of such votes since
the current justices began serving together
in the 1994-95 term.
In 1999-2000, 20 out of 73 decisions, or
27 percent, were by 5-to-4 votes. The
statistics for the previous five years are:
1998-99, 16 out of 75, 21 percent; 1997-
98, 15 out of 91, 16 percent; 1996-97, 17
out of 80, 21 percent; 1995-96, 12 out of
75, 16 percent; and 1994, 16 out of 82, 20
percent.
The cases on which the court divided 5 to
4 ranged from the monumental, like Bush
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v. Gore, to the more routine or obscure,
like a dispute between the United States
and Idaho over title to submerged lands
under Lake Coeur d'Alene. Six out of nine
civil rights cases were decided by 5-to-4
votes.
As in the past, the bloc of Chief Justice
William H Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas,
Anthony M. Kennedy and Sandra Day
O'Connor dominated in the closely
divided cases, prevailing in 14 of the 26.
The four more liberal justices -- John Paul
Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer --
prevailed in eight. (The remaining four
cases did not conform to either pattern.)
Last year the division was even sharper,
with the more liberal justices prevailing in
only one of the 5-to-4 cases, when Justice
O'Connor joined them to invalidate a
Nebraska abortion ban. This term, Justice
O'Connor joined them five times and
Justice Kennedy joined them in three
other cases.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor
continued to hold the balance of power
on the court. They were the only two
justices to dissent fewer than 10 times
during the temt Justice O'Connor
dissented nine times and Justice Kennedy
seven times. In six of those cases, he
signed another justice's dissenting
opinion. He felt moved to write his own
dissenting opinion only once, in an
immigration case decided on the term's
final day. In the 5-to-4 cases, each voted
in the majority 20 times, more than any
other justice.
During the term as a whole, Justice
Stevens dissented most often, 25 times,
followed by Justice Breyer with 23
dissents and Justice Ginsburg with 21. On
the right, Justices Scalia and Thomas were
also frequent dissenters, with 19 and 18
dissents, respectively. Justice Souter had
16 and Chief Justice Rehnquist had 14.
Following is a summary of the term's
most important decisions:
The Presidential Election
In its quest to preserve an infinitesimal
margin in Florida and win the state's
decisive 25 electoral votes, the Bush
campaign brought two cases to the court,
which decided them over an intense 18-
day period culminating with the 5-to-4
ruling that determined the outcome of the
election.
The first case, Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board, No. 00-836,
was an appeal from the Florida Supreme
Court's Nov. 21 decision that added 12
days to the deadline for certifying the
vote. Argued on Dec. 1, this case resulted
on Dec. 4 in a unanimous, unsigned and
opaque opinion vacating the state court's
decision and requesting clarification of the
basis for it.
Without answering the justices' questions,
the Florida Supreme Court then turned to
the Gore campaign's contest of the newly
certified results and ordered a statewide
manual recount of ballots that when
counted by machine had not indicated a
choice for president. The Bush campaign
appealed immediately and, as the recount
got under way, won a stay from the
justices by a vote of 5 to 4.
The court then heard the case, Bush v.
Gore, No. 00-949, on Dec. 11 and
decided it the next day in an unsigned
opinion that contained two conclusions:
that the lack of uniform standards for the
recount violated the 14th Amendment
guarantee of equal protection, and that
there was no time for the state to fix the
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problem and keep the recount going.
Thirty-six days after election day, the 2000
election, and the Supreme Court's role in
it, were history. The election was over.
The five in the majority were Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, Scalia and Thomas.
Criminal Law
Three decisions interpreting the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches indicated that the
court shared the country's concern about
the impact of some modem law
enforcement strategies on personal
privacy.
In Indianapolis v. Edmund, No. 99-1030,
the court ruled 6 to 3 that police
roadblocks aimed at discovering drugs in
cars through the use of trained dogs are
unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor said in
her majority opinion that unlike drunken
driving roadblocks, which the court has
upheld on public safety grounds, narcotics
roadblocks serve a general law
enforcement purpose and so cannot
escape the Fourth Amendment's
requirement that searches be based on
suspicion of individual wrongdoing. Chief
Justice Rehnquist dissented, along with
Justices Scalia and Thomas.
By the same 6-to-3 vote, the court ruled
that a public hospital cannot
constitutionally test maternity patients for
illegal drug use without their consent if
the purpose is to alert the police to a
crime. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion
in Ferguson v. Charleston, No. 99-936, a
challenge to a drug-testing program the
city of Charleston, S.C., put in place at its
public hospital at the height of concern
over so-called crack babies a decade ago.
In the third case, the court ruled 5 to 4
that the police may not use a thermal
imaging device, which can detect
suspicious patterns of heat emerging from
a private home, without obtaining a
warrant. Justice Scalia said in his majority
opinion that the Constitution's framers
would have regarded such technology as
sufficiently intrusive to require the same
warrant they demanded for physical entry
into a private home. Justices Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer joined the
majority in Kyllo v. United States, No. 99-
8508.
But in a fourth case, the court upheld
broad discretion for the police by ruling 5
to 4 that an officer who observes even a
minor infraction, like not wearing a seat
belt, may make a full custodial arrest even
if the maximum penalty for the offense is
a fine without jail time. The decision in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, No. 99-
1408, upheld the arrest of a Texas woman
who was driving her children home from
soccer practice without seat belts when
she was taken in handcuffs and placed in a
jail cell until she posted a $310 bond for
the $50 offense. Justice Souter wrote the
majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas.
The court overturned the death sentence
of a retarded man, Johnny Paul Penry, on
the ground that the instructions given to
the Texas jury that sentenced him did not
meet the standards the justices set when
they previously considered his case in a
1989 decision. The flawed instructions did
not guarantee that the jury would be able
to weigh Mr. Penry's retardation and
childhood experience of abuse as factors
in their decision, Justice O'Connor said
for the 6-to-3 majority in Penry v.
Johnson, No. 00-6677. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
dissented. Next term, the court will
consider the deeper question that this case
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did not pose: whether the Constitution
bars executing the retarded.
Federal Authority
The court's federalism revolution, which
over the last six years has resulted in new
constraints on Congressional authority
and a corresponding expansion of the
states' immunity from federal power,
continued with a 5-to-4 ruling that state
employees cannot sue for damages for
violations of the Americans With
Disabilities Act.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett, No. 99-1240, held
that while Congress intended to open the
states to such lawsuits, it had not validly
done so, for two reasons.
First, the court said, the 1990 law lacked
an adequate legislative record showing
that discrimination by the states
themselves, as opposed to society in
general, against people with disabilities
was a problem of sufficient dimension to
justify Congressional intervention.
Second, the court said, Congress cannot
place burdens on the states that go
beyond the Constitution itself, and
discrimination against employees with
disabilities, while violating federal policy,
does not violate the Constitution. The
others in the majority were Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas.
In the term's most important regulatory
ruling, the court unanimously rejected an
industry attack on the Clean Air Act and
ruled that in setting air quality standards,
the Environmental Protection Agency is
to consider only public health rather than
the cost-benefit analysis proposed by the
industry challengers. The broad discretion
Congress gave the agency did not amount
to an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority, Justice Scalia said for
the court in Whitman v. American
Trucking Associations, No. 99-1257.
Interpreting the Clean Water Act, the
court overturned a 15-year-old Army
Corps of Engineers regulation and held
that the law does not authorize the
government to regulate the dredging and
filling of isolated ponds and wetlands. The
vote in Solid Waste Agency v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers, No. 99-
1178, was 5 to 4, with a majority opinion
by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas.
Ruling on the scope of federal drug laws,
the court held 8 to 0 that Congress has
not recognized a "medical necessity"
exception to the prohibition on
distributing marijuana. The decision,
upholding a federal court injunction, was a
blow to the marijuana-distribution co-ops
that have grown up in California and
other states where state law authorizes the
use of marijuana to relieve symptoms of
various medical conditions. But the
decision, United States v. Oakland
Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative, No. 00-
151, did not directly address the state laws
and left many questions unanswered.
Justice Thomas wrote the opinion. Justice
Breyer -- whose younger brother, Charles,
ruled on the case as a federal district judge
in San Francisco -- did not participate.
Speech and Press
The court ruled 5 to 4 that Congress
violated the free speech rights of lawyers
in the federally financed legal services
program when it barred them from going
to court on behalf of indigent clients to
challenge the validity of welfare laws and
regulations. The 1996 law was an effort to
insulate the new federal welfare law from
legal attack But the law "distorts the legal
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system," Justice Kennedy said for the
majority in Legal Services Corporation v.
Velazquez, No. 99-603. Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined the
majority.
Giving the edge to the public's right to
know over claims of personal privacy, the
court ruled 6 to 3 that the press may not
be held liable for publishing illegally
intercepted information if the subject is of
"public importance" and the press did not
participate in the interception. The
majority opinion by Justice Stevens thus
created a narrowly defined First
Amendment exception to the federal
wiretap law, which imposes liability on
anyone who discloses the contents of
illegally intercepted communications.
Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg,
Breyer and O'Connor joined the majority
opinion in Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 99-
1687.
The court ruled 6 to 3 that as a matter of
free speech, public schools must open
their doors to after-hours religious
activities on the same basis as any other
after-school activity. The decision, Good
News Club v. Milford Central School, No.
99-2036, was a victory for a nationwide
evangelical Christian organization that
seeks to operate after-school Bible clubs
for young children. To exclude this
activity while permitting others would be
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination,
Justice Thomas said for the majority.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Breyer
were also in the majority.
The court reiterated its view of the
potentially corrupting influence of money
in politics, upholding a federal limit on the
amount parties may spend in coordination
with their own candidates. To exempt
parties from the limits, as the Colorado
Republican Party requested, would be to
invite circumvention of other limits,
Justice Souter said in Federal Election
Commission v. Colorado Republican
Federal Campaign Committee, No. 00-
191. Justices Thomas, Kennedy and Scalia
and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented.
The court upheld the right of the tobacco
industry to advertise its products to adult
consumers, striking down a far-reaching
advertising ban in Massachusetts. While
taking different approaches to the case, all
nine justices basically agreed in Lorillard
Tobacco v. Reilly, No. 00-596, that the
ban violated the tobacco advertisers' First
Amendment rights. The court also found
the state restrictions on advertising for
cigarettes, as opposed to cigars and
smokeless tobacco, to be pre-empted by
federal law. The pre-emption analysis was
5 to 4. Justice O'Connor's opinion was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by
Justices Scalia, Thomas and Kennedy.
The court ruled that an assessment on
mushroom growers to pay for generic
mushroom advertising under a federal
agricultural program violated the First
Amendment right against compelled
speech. Justice Kennedy wrote the
opinion in United States v. United Foods,
No. 00-276. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and
O'Connor dissented.
Finally, there was a statutory rather than
constitutional decision that involved the
press. In New York Times v. Tasini, No.
00-201, the court ruled that a group of
publishers, including The Times, infringed
the copyrights of freelance contributors
by making the freelancers' work accessible
without permission on electronic
databases after publication. The court did
not decide what remedy the freelance
writers should receive. Justice Ginsburg
wrote the 7-to-2 decision, with Justices






looked in both directions in
cases, indicating a deep split
play out in future cases.
A 5-to-4 decision upheld the latest
boundaries of North Carolina's long-
disputed 12th Congressional District,
ruling that the circuitous 47 percent black
district was the permissible result of
partisan considerations rather than an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander.
Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Easley
v. Cromartie, No. 99-1864, introduced
some pragmatic flexibility into the court's
treatment of legislative districts drawn
with an eye toward racial composition as
one of several factors. Justice O'Connor,
who had previously led the court in
striking down race-conscious districts,
joined the majority, as did Justices
Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.
Another 5-to-4 decision substantially
limited the effectiveness of one of the
most important civil rights laws, Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
bars discrimination in programs that
receive federal money. In an opinion by
Justice Scalia, the court ruled that
Congress did not intend private
individuals to be able to bring suits under
Title VI except for intentional
discrimination. Federal regulations barring
actions that have a discriminatory impact,
regardless of intent, could not provide a
basis for private lawsuits, he said. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy and Thomas joined the opinion
in Alexander v. Sandoval, No. 99-1908.
In an interpretation of the Americans
With Disabilities Act, the court ruled 7 to
2 that Casey Martin, a golfer with a
disability that prevented him from walking
the course, was entitled to use a golf cart
during tournament play despite the
opposition of the P.G.A. Tour. Writing
for the majority in P.G.A. Tour v. Martin,
No. 00-24, Justice Stevens said the cart
would not fundamentally alter the game,
the essence of which is shot-making, and
was the kind of reasonable
accommodation the law required. Justices
Scalia and Thomas dissented.
Immigration
By a 5-to-4 vote, the court rejected the
White House view that Congress in 1996
had stripped federal judges of the
authority to hear challenges to deportation
policies. Reviewing one such policy, the
court said deportation was not automatic
for immigrants who had pleaded guilty to
crimes before Congress changed the law
and barred administrative waivers of
deportation for "criminal aliens." To give
harsh new consequences to old plea
bargains made the law impermissibly
retroactive, Justice Stevens said for the
court in Immigration and Naturdlization
Service v. St. Cyr, No. 00-767. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia,
O'Connor and Thomas dissented.
The court ruled that the government
cannot keep a deportable alien in
indefinite detention for lack of a country
willing to receive him. Zadvydas v. Davis,
No. 99-7791, was another 5-to-4 decision.
This time, Justice O'Connor voted with
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter and
Ginsburg, while Justice Kennedy
dissented along with Justices Scalia and
Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
By a 5-to-4 vote, the court rejected a
constitutional challenge to an immigration
law provision that makes it easier for a
child born to unwed parents overseas to
be deemed an American citizen if the
mother rather than the father is an
American. The American father of a son
born in Vietnam to a Vietnamese mother
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challenged the law as violating his equal
protection rights. But Justice Kennedy
said for the majority that the law properly
reflected "basic biological differences"
between men and women, with mothers'
identity not needing further proof because
they are inevitably present at birth. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens,
Scalia and Thomas were the others in the
majority in Nguyen v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, No. 99-2071.
Labor
A 5-to-4 decision gave employers a major
victory by holding that companies can
enforce agreements to submit all
workplace disputes to binding arbitration
rather than litigation. Justice Kennedy
wrote the decision in Circuit City Stores v.
Adams, No. 99-1379, which resolved a
dispute over whether the Federal
Arbitration Act applies to ordinary
contracts of employment. Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined the majority opinion,
along with Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy and Thomas.
Property Rights
The court ruled 5 to 4 that someone who
bought property after restrictions on
development were in place could still
challenge the restnictions as an
unconstitutional "taking" of private
property. The court reinstated a lawsuit by
a waterfront landowner in Rhode Island
who acquired his 20 acres after the state
put landfill restrictions in place. The
question for future cases is what weight
courts will give to the date of ownership
in weighing the reasonableness of a
landowner's development expectations.
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion in
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, No. 99-2047,
with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas voting in
the majority.
Federalism
Board of Trustees v. Garrett
States are immune from job
discrimination suits under the Americans
With Disabilities Act.
Free Speech
Good News Club v. Milford Central
School
Equal access for after school religious
clubs.
Seat belt arrest
Atwater v. Lago Vista
Police can make custodial arrests for
minor offenses.
Illegal search
Kyllo v. United States
Use of thermal imaging devices is a search
requimng a warrant.
Campaign finance
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado
Republicans










Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
St. Cyr




Testing pregnant women's urine for drugs




Roadblocks where trained dogs sniff cars
for drugs are unconstitutional.
Clean Air Act
Whitman v. Amer. Trucking Assns.
E.P.A. may consider only public health
and not cost in setting new clean air
standards.
Copyright * 2001 The New York Ti3
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"Rehnquist Court" Sets Term Record
Chief Justice Leaves His Mark on Decisions
The Washington Times
Monday, July 23, 2001
Frank J. Murray
The current Supreme Court has
completed a historic seven terms and,
despite internal frictions and speculation
about retirement, the "Rehnquist court"
continues to flex its muscles.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist
makes his own impact felt mainly by
exercising the prerogative of the senior
justice in the majority to assign himself
or a kindred colleague to write the
opinion that goes into the lawbooks and
governs future cases.
Over the past seven terms - the longest
period without a vacancy since the court
was increased to nine justices - the chief
justice has voted with the majority in 476
of the 553 cases decided. He
thereby had the last word in choosing an
author to cany out the high court's
"province and duty ... to say what the
law is."
Fully 44.5 percent of the current court's
cases (246) were decided unanimously
while votes on the other 307 split, 116 of
them 5-4.
The four liberal justices haven't fared
well in the close votes. On the 116
appeals decided by a single vote since
October 1994, Justices John Paul
Stevens, David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer were in the majority
only 40 percent of the time. If court
competition were a sport, those four
wouldn't make the playoffs.
If it were a beauty contest, Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy would be Mr.
Congeniality for being most agreeable.
He voted with the majority 92.4 percent
overall and a stunning 86 percent of split
decisions.
Court analysts believed that some
Rehnquist votes that appeared to go
against the chief justice's own
conservative grain likely were cast for
lost causes so that he, and not Justice
Stevens, would decide who wrote for
history.
When stakes were highest and the vote
closest at 5-4, the one member of the
current court whom both sides were
likely to skip over most often was Justice
Ginsburg.
She hasn't written the opinion in any 5-4
case for more than five years.
Overall, Justice Ginsburg wrote only
four of the 116 opinions that were
decided by 5-4 vote since Stephen G.
Breyer replaced Harry A. Blackmun on
Aug. 3, 1994.
One of those four opinions was assigned
to Justice Ginsburg when Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor was the senior justice in
the majority. Justice O'Connor could
have named herself but has not done so
on either occasion when she was senior.
In the only other case in which Justice
O'Connor was senior justice in the
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majority of the present court - a 6-3
ruling on civil procedure - Justice
Ginsburg also wrote the opinion for the
court.
Justice Ginsburg's other two 5-4
assignments on the present court were
during the 1994 term, her second as a
justice. One case dealing with a motor
fuel tax was assigned by the chief justice,
and Justice John Paul Stevens assigned
the other, which involved a worker
injury.
Over the same period, the court's most
junior member, Justice Breyer, has
written three 5-4 opinions assigned by
the chief justice and eight assigned by
Justice Stevens when the chief voted the
other
way.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote 10 and
Justices Souter and Antonin Scalia each
had nine. Seven of those written by
Justice Souter were assigned by Justice
Stevens, while Justice Scalia's nine 5-4
opinions for the current court all were
assigned by is voting ally, the chief
justice.
Kennedy. Justice O'Connor has written
17 of the 116 cases with 5-4 votes by this
court while Justice Kennedy authored 14
and is believed also to have written the
unsigned per curiam opinion in Bush v.
Gore.
HIGH COURT'S SEVEN TERMS
On Aug. 3, the Supreme Court will have
completed seven full years without a
vacancy, its most stable period since
membership was increased to nine in
1837. Since October 1994, the present
court has decided 553 cases. Some
related numbers:
* Median age of present justices - 65
* Median age of all court retirees - 78
* Oldest current justice
* Youngest current justice
* Unanimous opinions -











Justice Scalia also had the opportunity
this term to assign one opinion to
himself when the chief justice and
Justices Stevens and O'Connor voted no.
Justice Scalia startled court watchers by
wnting
an opinion ruling that barred police use
of a device that detected heat on walls
and roof to indicate use of high-intensity
lighting at an indoor marijuana farm.
When the vote is close on a major case,
Chief Justice Rehnquist typically writes
the opinion himself or turns to Justices









* Wrote fewest dissents (Anthony M.
Kennedy) - 17
Most abstentions (Justice Breyer) - 6
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-
* Most opinions (William H Rehnquist)
- 70
* Fewest opinions (Justice Stevens-
Justice Thomas tie) - 57
Copyright @ 2001 The Washington Times
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A Majority of One
The New York Times
June 3, 2001
Jeffrey Rosen
We are all living now in Sandra Day
O'Connor's America. Take almost any of
the most divisive questions of American
life, and Justice O'Connor either has
decided it or is about to decide it on our
behalf. The Supreme Court may tell us
soon whether affirmative action in public
universities is permissible, and if it does,
O'Connor is likely to cast the deciding
vote. The court is divided about school
vouchers too; O'Connor's views will
probably tip the scales.
Voting districts drawn for the benefit of
minorities have to be submitted for
O'Connor's approval and stand or fall on
whether she finds their shapes bizarre.
Roe v. Wade has been tailored according
to O'Connor's specifications, and judges
and legislators have to scrutinize all
abortion restrictions in an effort to
predict whether O'Connor might
consider them an "undue burden" on the
right to choose. And in December
O'Connor helped to decide the
presidential election, joining the 5-4 vote
to stop the Florida recount and
delivering the White House to George
W. Bush.
Now, 20 years after she took her seat as
the first woman on the court, O'Connor
may see her power grow greater still.
After one television network prematurely
called Florida for Al Gore on election
night, John O'Connor, the justice's
husband, was reported to have expressed
distress, lamenting that O'Connor
wanted to retire and that Gore's victory
would make this impossible. The Bush
victory, presumably, cleared the way for
a smooth exit: O'Connor, who is 71,
could step down knowing her
replacement would be a Republican
nominee. Last month, however,
O'Connor announced that she had "no
present plans to retire." Speculation has
since focused on whether Chief Justice
William Rehnquist might resign. And if
he does, there are already Republicans
and even a few Democrats who have in
mind a natural successor Rehnquist's
Stanford Law School classmate and
fellow Arizonan, Sandra Day O'Connor.
Whether she becomes the first woman to
serve as chief justice, O'Connor is
already the most powerful woman in
America. How did she achieve this
formidable distinction? Part of the
explanation is the coincidence of her
position at the center of a divided court.
The Rehnquist court frequently decides
its most important cases by a single vote,
with the three conservatives (Rehnquist,
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas),
joined by the two moderate
conservatives (Anthony Kennedy and
O'Connor), in the majority and the four
liberals (John Paul Stevens, David
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen Breyer) in dissent. Kennedy and
O'Connor have long been competing for
the role of decisive swing vote: from
1994 to 2000, each was on the winning
side of the same number of 5-4 cases.
Last term, O'Connor wrote only one
dissenting opinion, approaching Justice
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William Brennan's record of zero
dissents in 1967 at the height of the
Warren era.
But there have been many swing votes in
the history of the court. O'Connor is
arguably the most powerful of all of
them because of the distinctive way she
approaches her job. In case after case,
she will join the majority and then write
a concurring opinion that seems
designed to drain her colleagues'
reasoning of its more general
implications. She has a habit of confining
her vote to the case at hand. Her views
are so exquisitely calibrated that once in
a voting rights case she wrote a separate
concurrence to her own opinion,
prompting Pam Karlan, a voting rights
scholar at Stanford Law School, to say,
"At last, O'Connor has found someone
she can agree with: herself."
O'Connor's narrow opinions have the
effect of preserving her ability to change
her mind in future cases. It is not that
O'Connor is easily swayed by the
lobbying of her fellow justices: there is
little lobbying or horse-trading on the
Rehnquist court. (Indeed, the justices
rarely have substantive discussions.) It is
that she approaches her job less like a
typical justice than like the state legislator
she once was. O'Connor, who prefers
vague standards to clear rules, does not
derive her opinions from consistent
principles that guide her from case to
case. Her pragmatic approach allows her
to remain not only at the center of the
court but also at the center of American
politics.
Antonin Scalia, O'Connor's frequent
sparring partner, has noted that deciding
cases according to principle is the way
that judges restrain themselves. "When,
in writing for the majority of the court, I
adopt a general rule and say, 'This is the
basis of our decision,' I not only
constrain lower courts, I constrain
myself as well," Scalia declared in his
Holmes Lecture at Harvard in 1989. "If
the next case should have such different
facts that my political or policy
preferences regarding the outcome are
quite the opposite, I will be unable to
indulge those preferences; I have
committed myself to the governing
principle." Scalia sometimes betrays his
own principles -- ignoring the original
understanding of the Constitution in
voting rights cases, for example -- but he
reminds us how important it is for judges
to have principles to betray.
By her refusal to commit herself to
consistent principles, O'Connor forces
the court and those who follow it to
engage in a guessing game about her
wishes in case after case. Each of her
decisions is a ticket for one train only.
This is not to say, however, that there are
no consistencies that mark her tenure.
Over the years she has emerged as the
leader of the federalism revolution that
may be the Rehnquist court's most
distinctive legacy, returning power from
Washington to the states. And although
she is not a committed social
conservative, she is a committed
antigovernment conservative -- a justice
eager to second-guess the judgments of
state and federal lawmakers and
executives. By refusing to defer to
Congress and the president, she has
enhanced not only her own power but
also the power of the court itself. If she
is, in fact, nominated as the next chief
justice, her generally moderate votes
should give less pause than her view that
no branch of government is entitled to
respect except the one to which she
belongs.
O'Connor was the first woman to be
elected majority leader of any state
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senate in the nation, and her experience
as an Arizona legislator continues to
influence the way she approaches her
job. Most Saturdays when the court is in
session, she and her clerks meet in
chambers to discuss the cases that she
will consider during oral arguments in
the week to follow. "She makes lunch for
everybody -- Tex-Mex, Southwestern
fare," says Marci Hamilton, a former
clerk who is now a professor at Cardozo
Law School in New York. "She cooks it
up and brings it from home. Then we
would sit down and talk about the cases
and eat."
There are justices -- Scalia and Thomas,
for example -- who conduct their
discussions with clerks as freewheeling
debates about the law. O'Connor's
discussions are more formal, like a
senator's receiving briefings from her
staff. She is unusual among justices in
requiring her clerks to write extensive
memorandums about a case before any
discussion. During the Saturday
meetings, a clerk who has prepared a
memorandum will give a brief
presentation; then O'Connor will ask the
other clerks to make short presentations
of their own.
After hearing her clerks' views and
reviewing the briefs, O'Connor
sometimes announces her vote or
suggests that she has not yet made up
her mind. At oral arguments, she is an
active questioner and often makes little
effort to conceal her views, confessing
her ambivalence or revealing her
skepticism about one side or the other.
She is genuinely open-minded in many
cases, especially those involving race and
religion, and -- like a legislator -- is
especially moved by arguments about the
practical effects of a decision.
Once she makes up her mind, however,
O'Connor continues to try to keep her
options open. Like a politician, she is
careful not to tie herself down in the
future, instructing her clerks to write
majority opinions as narrowly as
possible. "She tries very hard to avoid
broad rules, for fear that if you speak too
broadly, you might bind yourself down
the road," says one former clerk, who,
like most of O'Connor's former clerks I
spoke with, asked not to be identified.
(The justice was said to be infuriated a
few years ago by Edward Lazarus's
"Closed Chambers," a tell-all book about
the court.) Another former clerk says:
"She's very careful to write minimalist
opinions, taking each case one at a time
and trying not to decide too much that's
not before the court. She really has no
grand constitutional theory. But that's a
different sense of calculatedness than the
idea that she holds out in order to dictate
what the court says, which I didn't see at
all."
In a C-Span profile broadcast last
December, O'Connor described her
typical day. "I'm a fan of reading a
newspaper in the morning," she said. "By
5:30 or so I'm awake and ready to get up
and get going, and I'm usually outside ...
looking for the newspaper before it's
even arrived. And once it does, we have
a little breakfast and read the paper and I
go down to the court. ... I try to leave
the house around 7:15 to go downtown
and beat some of the traffic. And the
first thing I do at the court is have an
hour of exercise." Since her first days on
the bench, O'Connor has organized a
morning aerobics and yoga class for
female clerks and employees on the
Supreme Court basketball court, known
as the highest court in the land.
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More than some of her colleagues,
O'Connor enjoys the ceremonial aspects
of her job and has handled the public
scrutiny that accompanies being the first
female justice with poise and confidence.
According to Ruth McGregor, who
clerked for O'Connor in 1981 and now
sits on the Arizona Supreme Court,
O'Connor received more than 500 letters
a week during her first term, and she
tried to answer all of them. "The thing I
noticed was how personal the
communications were, partly because her
hearings had been televised and perhaps
people related more easily to a woman,"
McGregor says. "People sent hand-knit
socks and homemade fudge and pictures
of their grandchildren."
The mail has tapered off a little over the
years, but O'Connor continues to travel
the world like a head of state, giving
worthy speeches at law-school
dedications and international events
about the importance of federalism and
hard work She is a fixture on the
Georgetown party circuit, where her
husband, John, a Washington lawyer, is
popular for telling humorous stories in
Scottish and Irish dialect. She is also
attentive to her press clippings. "Charles
Barkley came to the court one day with
Justice Thomas, and Thomas, being the
way he is, he doesn't tell anybody about
it," recalls a former clerk for another of
the justices. When O'Connor learned
that Barkley was in the building, she had
him photographed for The Washington
Post Style section putting an ornament
on the Christmas tree in her chambers.
In addition to cultivating her public
persona, O'Connor takes a warm interest
in her clerks' welfare and goes out of her
way to organize events and outings for
their amusement and instruction. Clerks
recall excursions to see the cherry
blossoms, a tour of Washington by a
Civil War historian and outings with the
justice for white-water rafting, fly fishing
and hiking in the Blue Ridge Mountains.
"She loves to hike, she loves skiing, she
loves tennis, she loves golf," says her
brother, H Alan Day. A few days after
deciding Bush v. Gore, she scored her
first hole in one.
Early in her tenure, several
commentators suggested that
O'Connor's opinions were wntten in a
distinctively feminine voice. In 1986,
Suzanna Sherry, then a law professor at
the University of Minnesota, cited the
works of Carol Gilligan on behalf of the
proposition that "while women
emphasize connection, subjectivity and
responsibility, men emphasize autonomy,
objectivity and rights." Painting
O'Connor as the apotheosis of
"difference" feminism, Sherry ventured
that the justice's preference for
moderation over confrontation -- and
community over individualism -- was
attributable to her sex. O'Connor herself
has little patience for these stereotypes,
and in a speech at N.Y.U in 1991, she
strenuously rejected Sherry's thesis. "This
'New Feminism' is interesting but
troubling, precisely because it so nearly
echoes the Victorian myth of the 'True
Woman' that kept women out of law for
so long," O'Connor declared. "Asking
whether women attorneys speak with a
'different voice' than men do is a
question that is both dangerous and
unanswerable."
According to Marci Hamilton, the
former O'Connor clerk "When you
grow up riding wild horses -- Western
women tend not to buy that different
voices stuff. They tend to be pretty
much in the camp of 'Annie Get Your
Gun': Anything he can do, I can do
better."
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Being a woman has shaped O'Connor's
work far less, it would seem, than being a
legislator. O'Connor's service as majority
leader of the Arizona State Senate was
one of the formative experiences of her
life, and it is remarkable how much her
approach as majority leader anticipates
the role that she would come to play on
the Supreme Court. In the 1970's, the
Arizona Senate was almost evenly
divided: 16 Republicans and 14
Democrats. Most of the issues that
O'Connor faced were practical
challenges -- like the effort to divert
water from the Colorado River to
Arizona as part of the Central Arizona
Project -- and her tendency was to
confront them in a bipartisan spirit. "I
can't remember a damn thing we ever
came to blows over really," recalls Bob
Stump, who was the Democratic
minority leader during O'Connor's years
as majority leader and is now a
Republican congressman from Arizona,
having switched parties in 1982. At the
end of each session, Stump says,
O'Connor would invite Democrats and
Republicans over to her house for a
bipartisan party, where she would cook
burritos and tortillas.
According to Stump, O'Connor's chief
opposition came not primarily from
Democrats but from the John Birch
wing of her own party, which was
clamoring to abolish the income tax and
investigate the United Nations. "It was
more moderating them than it was
bringing our side around," he says. As
majority leader, O'Connor viewed it as
her mandate to rein in the conservative
extremists. And she was independent-
minded enough to break ranks with her
party on issues she cared deeply about.
Stump says that the Senate, with
overwhelming Democratic and
Republican support, passed a law giving
direct financial aid to parochial schools.
Insisting that the bill was
unconstitutional, O'Connor was the only
Republican to join three Democrats in
opposing it. "In those days, that was a
very unpopular thing to do," Stump says.
Later the Arizona Supreme Court agreed
with O'Connor's position and struck
down the law.
O'Connor has shown similar
independence on the Supreme Court,
suggesting that the Constitution permits
some aid to religious schools and some
race consciousness, but not too much --
which is more or less the view of the
majority of American voters. A few
weeks ago, for example, after voting
repeatedly to strike down voting districts
drawn for the benefit of minorities,
O'Connor broke rank with her
conservative colleagues and decided that
she could live with a redrawn North
Carolina voting district that she had first
expressed concern about in 1993.
I called David Garrow, the Pulitzer
Prize-winning author and a Supreme
Court historian at Emory Law School, to
ask what he made of her apparent
change of heart. "Is there an extensive,
deep-seated indecisiveness to her?"
Garrow asked. "And is there something
wrong about using 'indecisive' to
characterize a female justice?" Garrow
posed some more blunt questions.
"Does she at some deep level doubt her
own ability? Is that the way to
understand this two-steps-forward, two-
steps-back quality to her decision
making, that she's not at all certain about
her own judgment? If she doesn't lack
the courage of her convictions, she lacks
the clarity of her convictions."
These are strong sentiments -- and I
have expressed similar sentiments in the
past. But those who have worked with
O'Connor insist that she is anything but
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indecisive, as does O'Connor herself.
"When I'm at the court faced with a case,
I try to find out everything about that
case I can," O'Connor told the National
Coalition of Cancer Survivorship in
1996. "Then I make my decision, and I
don't look back I do not look back and
say, 'Oh, what if I had done the other
thing,' or 'Oh, I should have done
something else."'
Deborah Jones Merritt, another of
O'Connor's former clerks -- she is now
the director of the John Glenn Institute
at Ohio State -- says: "Indecisive is
probably the last word I would ever
choose to describe Justice O'Connor.
She would listen to all the arguments, get
the answers and then be very decisive
about her view in the case."
In her decisiveness about the bottom
line, O'Connor operates in marked
contrast to her fellow swing justice,
Anthony Kennedy. "I'm more of an
agonizer than many of our colleagues,"
Kennedy told me five years ago. In his
meetings with clerks, Kennedy
experiments with different opinions. He
sketches out various arguments on a
white board in his chambers, often
announcing that he is persuaded by one
position only to return the next morning
to declare that he has been thinking
about the case ovemight and now is
inclined to take the opposite view. Once
Kennedy makes up his mind, however,
he is far more willing than O'Connor to
embrace broad principles that constrain
his discretion in future cases.
During a recent visit to O'Connor's
office, I found a bit more evidence of
her decisiveness. She declined to grant
an interview for this article but kindly
agreed to show me around her
chambers. At the front of the Supreme
Court Building, her airy inner office,
painted in Southwestern earth tones, has
a spectacular view of the Capitol and the
court steps, where there were protesters
demonstrating against Roe v. Wade and
Bush v. Gore. Her inner office is
decorated with Zuni drums, a Carl Oscar
Borg landscape of the Grand Canyon
and George Catlin paintings of a buffalo
hunt in the Rocky Mountains. With her
steady gaze and beige suit, O'Connor
seemed like a formidable C.E.O. of the
most powerful corporation in America,
but she was also gracious and candid,
although understandably wary. (I've
written critically about several of her
decisions.) She came to life when I
produced a copy of "Where the Bluebird
Sings to the Lemonade Springs," a
collection of essays by her favorite
author, Wallace Stegner. And she talked
with warmth and enthusiasm about
Stegner, the great chronicler of the West
who was also her creative-writing teacher
at Stanford.
Soon, it was time for our tour. By her
large desk, there was a cartoon of
O'Connor on a swing being pushed by
Jerry Falwell. Above it was a framed
front page from Newsday celebrating her
confirmation in 1981 with the headline
"Her Honor." There were photographs
of O'Connor's three sons and her
grandchildren. As I tried to take it all in,
she bustled me along to the outer office,
past a signed basketball from the U.S.
Women's Olympic team. Suddenly, the
tour was over. Realizing that I had left
the Stegner book on the couch in her
inner chambers, I went back to retrieve
it. On the chair where the justice had
been sitting, I noticed a hand-stitched
pillow, embroidered with the motto:
"Maybe in error but never in doubt."
By her own account, the roots of
O'Connor's self-confidence came from
her upbringing riding horses and roping
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steers on the Lazy B cattle ranch, a 250-
square-mile tract on the Arizona-New
Mexico border that is 35 miles from the
nearest town and 12 miles from the
nearest neighbor. During the C-Span
biography, O'Connor quoted Wallace
Stegner's description of growing up in
the West: "There is something about
living in big empty space, where people
are few and distant, under a great sky
that is alternately serene and furious,
exposed to sun from 4 in the morning
until 9 at night, and to a wind that never
seems to rest -- there is something about
exposure to that big country that not
only tells an individual how small he is,
but steadily tells him who he is."
O'Connor continued with a vivid
recollection of driving around the ranch
in a pickup truck with her father, waiting
for the rain that the grass and the cattle
needed to survive. "Rain was our life's
blood . . . the essential element, the most
treasured event, prayed for, hoped for,
anticipated, savored when it came . . .
celebrated and enjoyed -- every drop,"
she recalled. "Joy, wonder, incredible gift
from above."
O'Connor and her 61-year-old brother,
Alan Day, have been writing a memoir
about growing up on the ranch, which is
scheduled for publication early next year.
"A lot of people have asked Sandra
through the years how someone from a
rural, humble, agricultural background
could have achieved what she's achieved,
and maybe this book is a long answer to
that question," Day says. Day, who ran
the family ranch for many years, says that
his sister's upbringing as a rancher made
her independent and self-reliant. "You
would be out on the ranch in a pickup or
on horseback, or whatever," he relates,
"when you would come upon a situation
that needed a response: a broken fence
or a windmill or a sick cow or a flat tire
or a broken fan belt. There wasn't
anybody to call and there wasn't anybody
to take care of you. You very quickly
learned that you're responsible for
yourself." In deliberate Western cadences
very similar to his sister's, Day expresses
moving, brotherly admiration for her
impressive example: "The essence of
Sandra is that if you're around her very
much, the bar is raised in your life. You
just feel like doing better things and
being a better person."
After attending school in El Paso, where
she lived during the school year with her
grandmother, O'Connor enrolled at
Stanford at 16 and then after graduating
attended Stanford Law School. At law
school, she dated her classmate William
Rehnquist and met her future husband
and fellow law-review editor, John
O'Connor.
The story of her progress after law
school has been told often. Because of
her sex, she was unable to get a job in a
law firm; instead, she became a deputy
county attorney in San Mateo, Calif., in
1952. After spending several years in
Germany, where John served in the
Army, the couple moved to Arizona,
where O'Connor set up a private practice
in a shopping mall. After taking some
time off to have three sons, she returned
to full-time work when her youngest boy
began school. She spent four years as an
assistant attorney general in Arizona,
where she developed a reputation for
attention to detail. In 1964, she served as
a precinct captain for Barry Goldwater,
who remained a close friend until his
death. (A picture of both of them hangs
in her chambers, inscribed, "Hi Sandy --
Love, Barry.") Appointed in 1969 to fill a
vacancy as an Arizona state senator, she
was elected on her own the following
year, and in 1973 she became majorityleader.
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In the Arizona Senate, O'Connor was
less socially conservative than some of
her Republican colleagues, not only
opposing aid to religious schools but also
staking out a moderate position on
abortion. In 1970, three years before Roe
was decided, O'Connor voted to repeal
Arizona's draconian anti-abortion law,
and the year after Roe came down, she
voted against a petition asking Congress
to pass a human life amendment to the
Constitution. In her interview with
President Reagan before he nominated
her to the court -- she was by then a
judge on the Arizona Court of Appeals --
O'Connor emphasized her personal
opposition to abortion but did not
commit herself one way or the other on
the subject of Roe. During her
confirmation hearings, her fiercest
opposition came from anti-abortion
conservatives who felt that her moderate
record on abortion in the Arizona
Legislature meant that she could not be
counted on to overturn Roe. As it turned
out, O'Connor's conservative critics were
right to worry. O'Connor staked out her
ambivalent position in the very first
abortion case she heard, in 1983, in
which she denounced Roe without
explicitly calling for it to be overturned.
Instead, she proposed her own test for
evaluating restrictions on a woman
seeking an abortion -- whether the
restriction "unduly burdened" the right
to choose. By adopting the vague "undue
burden" language, O'Connor gave
herself lots of discretion to decide, from
case to case, whether or not she
considered a particular abortion
restriction permissible.
Between 1983 and 1992, O'Connor
upheld every abortion restriction she
confronted. According to Lazarus's
"Closed Chambers," liberal clerks were
so concerned that O'Connor would
overturn Roe that a few female clerks
toyed with the idea of having one of
them fake an unwanted pregnancy and
break down while discussing it in the
locker room after O'Connor's morning
aerobics class, so that the justice was
certain to overhear. But these theatrics
were unnecessary. in 1989, despite strong
pressure from conservatives, O'Connor
refused to provide the fifth vote to
overturn Roe itself. And three years later
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a case
involving a Pennsylvania anti-abortion
law, she joined Souter and Kennedy in
upholding what they called the core
holding of Roe: namely, that states may
not place serious restrictions on abortion
before fetal viability.
O'Connor's performance in Casey was
characteristically self-assured and
judicially aggressive. According to a
former clerk involved with the decision,
she was most offended by the provisions
of the Pennsylvania law requiring wives
to notify their husbands before having
an abortion. Having decided to strike
that down, she was amenable to Souter's
suggestion that they write an opinion
that would preserve the core of Roe. She
and Souter then approached Kennedy,
who agreed to adopt O'Connor's "undue
burden" standard as the new test for
evaluating all abortion restrictions. While
Kennedy agonized endlessly about the
decision -- wavering until the final days
before the opinion circulated and musing
openly about writing a brief opinion that
would sidestep the question of whether
abortion is a fundamental right --
O'Connor made her decision and never
looked back. Using the same reasoning
that she would turn to in Bush v. Gore,
the majority opinion justified the
decision to short-circuit the political
debate about abortion on the grounds
that the court had to save the country
from legislative battles that could only
polarize and divide Americans.
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Last summer, when it came time to
evaluate the constitutionality of so-called
partial-birth abortion laws, O'Connor
provided a fifth vote for Stephen
Breyer's expansive 5-4 decision striking
down 31 state laws that restrict late-term
abortions. Kennedy, by contrast, wrote
an angry dissent, suggesting that he had
been duped in 1992 into supporting a
malleable legal standard that O'Connor
and the liberal justices were invoking to
strike down abortion restrictions far later
in pregnancy than he had anticipated --
restrictions supported by George W.
Bush, Al Gore and two-thirds of the
American people.
O'Connor's conservatism is found less in
her views about social issues than in her
views about where political power rests.
She is adamantly anti-Washington. She is
not alone, of course. In its view toward
federal power, the Rehnquist court is the
least deferential court in American
history. Seth Waxman, who served as
solicitor general in the Clinton
administration, notes that in the first 200
years after the Constitution was ratified,
the Supreme Court struck down only
127 federal laws. In the past six years
alone, the Rehnquist court has struck
down 28 federal laws. O'Connor joined
all but six of these decisions. (The most
restrained justices are Breyer and
Ginsburg, who dissented in half the
cases.)
Her attachment to states' rights seems to
have stemmed from her upbringing on
the Lazy B ranch, where her father was
an opponent of Franklin D. Roosevelt
and the New Deal. Today, less than 15
percent of the land is privately owned in
Arizona, and federal land and water
regulations are a constant source of
frustration to ranchers like her brother.
"I got really discouraged with the way
the federal government leases their land
for grazing," Alan Day says. "Sandra is
very much a federalist, which is saying
the states should be able to solve more
of their problems and the federal
government should stick their nose in as
little as possible. I think that certainly
comes from her heritage in the West."
But during the past few years, it has
become increasingly clear that the
federalism revolution that O'Connor has
led is not only about states' rights. It is
also about the growing determination of
O'Connor and her conservative
colleagues to reserve for themselves the
exclusive authority to decide what counts
as illegal and impermissible in America.
Last year, for example, O'Connor and
the four conservative justices held that
private individuals could not sue the
states for violating the federal age
discrimination act. O'Connor did not
think that age discrimination was a
national problem, even though Congress
thought otherwise when it passed the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Later that same year, O'Connor joined
the four conservatives in striking down
part of the Violence Against Women
Act. They dismissed the voluminous
evidence that had led Congress to
conclude that the states were failing to
respond adequately to gender-motivated
violence. In this and other cases,
O'Connor's experience as a state
legislator seems to have given her a
robust skepticism about the state and
federal legislative process. "Somebody
was making the case about a state
legislature, and the gist of her comment
was, I was in a state legislature -- I know
how foolishly they can act,"' a former
clerk remembers. "Having been there,
she understood that these were not such
wise deliberative bodies."
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Refusing to Court Favor Youngest Justice Accepts Being "Thom in the
Side of Those Who Villify Him"
The Atlanta Constitution
Tuesday, July 3, 2001
Ken Foskett
Part 3 of a series about Clarence Thomas
running Sunday 7/1, Monday 7/ 2,
Tuesday 7/3/2001.
JUSTICE THOMAS: IN HIS
WORDS
Clarence Thomas of Georgia has written
opinions on a wide variety of topics
since taking his seat on the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1991. Here
are excerpts from some of his opinions:
> Anti-gang, anti-loitering laws
Chicago v. Morales (1999)
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court
agreed with Illinois courts that Chicago's
anti-gang ordinance violated due process
and was an arbitrary restriction on
personal liberties. Thomas dissented.
"Today, the court focuses extensively on
the 'rights' of gang members and their
companions. It can safely do so --- the
people who will have to live with the
consequences of today's opinion do not
live in our neighborhoods. Rather, the
people who will suffer from our lofty
pronouncements are . . . people who
have seen their neighborhoods literally
destroyed by gangs and violence and
drugs. They are good, decent people who
must struggle to overcome their
desperate situation, against all odds, in
order to raise their families, earn a
living, and remain good citizens. . . . By
focusing exclusively on the imagined
'rights' of the two percent, the Court
today has denied our most vulnerable
citizens the very thing that Justice (John
Paul) Stevens elevates above all else ---
the 'freedom of movement.' And that is a
shame."
> Freedom of religion
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
(1995)
The university allowed its student
activities fund to pay printing costs for
various student groups, but withheld
payment for a Christian group, saying its
newspaper violated school prohibitions
against promoting a particular belief.
Lower courts sided with the university,
but the Supreme Court voted 5-4 to
reverse their decision. Thomas
concurred.
"This case provides an opportunity to
reaffirm one basic principle that has
enjoyed an uncharacteristic degree of
consensus: The (Establishment) Clause
does not compel the exclusion of
religious groups from government
benefits programs that are generally
available to a broad class of participants
. . I If the Establishment Clause is
offended when religious adherents
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benefit from neutral programs such as
the University of Virginia's Student
Activities Fund, it must also
be offended when they receive the same
benefits in the form of in-kind
subsidies."
> Affirmative action
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena
(1995)
The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 for
Adarand Constructors Inc., which said
the federal practice of encouraging
government contractors to hire
subcontractors controlled by
"disadvantaged individuals" --- and its
use of race to identify them --- was
unconstitutional. Thomas concurred.
"That these programs may have been
motivated, in part, by good intentions
cannot provide refuge from the principle
that under our Constitution, the
government may not make distinctions
on the basis of race. As far as the
Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant
whether a government's racial
classifications are drawn by those who
wish to oppress a race or by those who
have a sincere desire to help those
thought to be disadvantaged. There can
be no doubt that the paternalism that
appears to lie at the heart of this program
is at war with the principle of inherent
equality that underlies and infuses our
Constitution."
> Voting rights
Holder v. Hall (1994)
In the mid-1980s, black voters in
Bleckley County, Ga., challenged the
county's single-commissioner
government, saying it limited the
political influence of black voters. They
won at the appellate court level, but the
Supreme Court reversed the decision on
a 5-4 vote. Thomas concurred.
"The system we have instituted
affirmatively encourages a racially based
understanding of the representative
function. The clear premise of the
system is that geographic districts are
merely a device to be manipulated to
establish 'black representatives' whose
real constituencies are defined, not in
terms of the voters who populate their
districts, but in terms of race."
> Cruel and unusual punishment
Hudson v. McMillian (1992)
The Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that
excessive force against a prisoner may
be considered cruel and unusual
punishment even though the inmate is
not seriously injured. Thomas dissented.
"In my view, a use of force that causes
only insignificant harm to a prisoner
may be immoral, it may be tortious, it
may be criminal, and it may even be
remediable under other provisions of the
Federal Constitution, but it is not 'cruel
and unusual punishment.' In
concluding to the contrary, the Court
today goes far beyond our precedents."
> Free speech
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
(1995)
In 1989, Margaret McIntyre was fined$100 for distributing unsigned political
leaflets against a school tax referendum
the previous year. In a 7-2 decision, the
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Supreme Court overturned the Ohio
courts. Thomas concurred.
"After reviewing the weight of the
historical evidence, it seems that the
framers (of the U.S. Constitution)
understood the First Amendment to
protect an author's right to express his
thoughts on political candidates or issues
in an anonymous fashion."
> Commerce clause
United States v. Lopez (1995)
The Supreme Court voted 5-4 to strike
down the Gun Free School Zones Act of
1990, saying the law exceeded the
authority of Congress to "regulate
commerce ... among the several states."
The case involved a Texas 12th-grader
who was arrested for carrying a
concealed weapon to school. Thomas
concurred.
"It seems to me that the power to
regulate 'commerce' can by no means
encompass authority over mere gun
possession, any more than it
empowers the federal government to
regulate marriage, littering, or cruelty to
animals, throughout the 50 states. Our
Constitution quite properly leaves such
matters to the individual states,
notwithstanding these activities' effects
on interstate commerce. Any
interpretation of the Commerce Clause
that even suggests that Congress could
regulate such matters is in need of re-
examination."
> Federalism
U.S. Term Limits Inc. v. Thornton(1995)
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
upheld lower court decisions declaring a
term limits amendment in Arkansas
unconstitutional. The amendment limited
the state's members of the U.S. House to
three terms and its U.S. senators to two
terms. Thomas dissented.
"Nothing in the Constitution deprives the
people of each state of the power to
prescribe eligibility requirements for the
candidates who seek to represent them in
Congress. The Constitution is simply
silent on this question. And where the
Constitution is silent, it raises no bar to
action by the states or the people. ...
Contrary to the majoritys suggestion,
the people of the States need not point to
any affirmative grant of power in the
Constitution in order to prescribe
qualifications for their representatives in
Congress, or to authorize their elected
state legislators to do so."
> School desegregation
Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)
In a long-running school desegregation
case, a federal court ordered Missouri to
give salary increases to virtually all
instructional and non-instructional staff
within the Kansas City School District
and to continue to fund remedial "quality
education" programs. The Supreme
Court overturned a lower court in a 5-4
decision. Thomas concurred. "It never
ceases to amaze me that the courts are so
willing to assume that anything that is
predominantly black must be inferior.
Instead of focusing on remedying the
harm done to those black schoolchildren
injured by segregation, the District Court
here sought to convert the Kansas City,
Missouri, School District into a 'magnet
district' that would reverse the 'white
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flight' caused by de jure segregation....
Two threads in our jurisprudence have
produced this unfortunate situation....
First, the court has read our cases to
support the theory that black students
suffer an unspecified psychological harm
from segregation that retards their
mental and educational development.
This approach not only relies on
questionable social science research
rather than constitutional principle, but it
also rests on an assumption of black
inferiority. Second, we have permitted
the federal courts to exercise virtually
unlimited equitable powers to remedy
this alleged constitutional violation. The
exercise of this authority has trampled
upon principles of federalism and the
separation of powers."
On the Web: The full text of the
opinions by Thomas and other members
of the Supreme Court are available at
Cornell University's Legal Information
Institute Web site at:
http://supct.law.comell.edu/supct/ /
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Last September, as Clarence Thomas
fielded questions at the University of
Louisville, a student wanted to know:
Does the Supreme Court justice write all
his own opinions?
Thomas' deadpan rejoinder jolted the
audience: "No, Justice Scalia does." The
students laughed nervously.
The brief stab at humor was the second
time in 30 minutes that Thomas
confronted a perception that has dogged
him for 10 years: Justice Antonin Scalia,
a white man of Italian descent, is the
puppeteer who guides his votes and
crafts his judicial opinions.
"Because I am black, it is said that
Justice Scalia has to do my work for
me," Thomas said earlier. "He must
somehow have a chip in my brain and
controls me that way."
In fact, Thomas has authored dozens of
provocative opinions and dissents ---
none that rank as landmark legal cases --
- but brick by brick he is building a
judicial legacy that could affect the
nation for decades to come.
Thomas has spent his entire public life
seeking to distinguish himself as an
independent thinker who transcends skin
color. But not even the white marble
walls of the Supreme Court, hewn from
the hills of his native Georgia, have
insulated him from racial stereotyping.
Thomas' race played a powerful role in
shaping his political beliefs, and it
continues to shape his judicial
philosophy. Of the nearly 1,000 cases
that he has voted on, decisions dealing
with affirmative action, school
desegregation and voting rights have
won the most attention.
Thomas' mere presence on the Supreme
Court has emboldened black
conservatives around the country. But
his race and political views continue to
make him a lightning rod for criticism.
"I don't see an overwhelming amount of
compassion for people less well off in
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our society," American University law
professor Stephen Wermiel said. "I see
somebody who seems to care more
deeply about the text of the Constitution
and the process of reading it than its
beneficiaries."
Thomas is an integral part of the
conservative faction that has steered the
court back from the perceived excesses
of the Warren and Burger courts.
But, perhaps because he has spent less
time as a judge, Thomas is more willing
than his colleagues to overturn well-
established precedents, according to
Scott Gerber, an Ohio Northern
University law professor who wrote
"First Principles: The Jurisprudence of
Clarence Thomas."
"He's more bold and adventurous," said
Gerber.
Thomas anchors his judicial thinking in
the promise of equality spelled out in the
Declaration of Independence and the
notion of ordered liberty embodied in the
Constitution. But echoes of Thomas'
experiences with segregation and
affirmative action ring throughout his
legal writings.
A beneficiary of affirmative action,
Thomas nonetheless concluded that
affirmative action stigmatizes blacks in
ways that are ultimately destructive.
As both black and conservative, he grew
to detest the expectation that, because of
his skin color, he should be liberal. That
mind-set drives his decisions on voting
rights and redistricting cases affecting
racial minorities.
At his core, Thomas believes
passionately that God created the races
equally, and he loathes laws and
programs that, however subtly, assume
otherwise. Thomas rejects government
paternalism in any form.
He believes in rules --- the fewer the
better, and the same ones for everybody,
no matter what their skin color. As he
told students in Louisville, Ky., he grew
up under a system with two sets of
books: one for whites and one for blacks.
"I'm not going back to two sets of
books," he said firmly.
"I don't need people to agree with me,"
he added a few moments later. "I'm very
comfortable being alone in my views."
Turning right from left
Thomas' evolution into a conservative
Republican was remarkably quick.
When he left Savannah in 1968 to attend
Holy Cross College in Massachusetts,
Thomas by his own admission was an
angry and confused young man.
Assassins had killed the Rev. Martin
Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy
that year. Blacks across America were
protesting and rioting over the lingering
injustices of racism and inequality.
Thomas, one of only 25 blacks at Holy
Cross, helped start the Black Student
Union. He grew an Afro. He wore
military fatigues and combat boots.
Thomas distributed the Black Panthers'
literature and helped with their breakfast
program for the poor. Later, he
characterized his politics at the time as
"radical left."
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But Thomas developed second thoughts
toward the end of his three years at Holy
Cross. He told Patrick O'Daniel, a
former clerk, that a turning point came
when he went to the Panthers'
headquarters and found crates of rotting
eggs intended for the breakfast program.
The Panthers were just a front, not really
interested in helping black people, he
concluded.
"He became very disillusioned by that,"
O'Daniel said.
Another defining moment, Thomas said
in one speech, came in 1970 when he
participated in a student protest to "free
the political prisoners."
"Why was I doing this rather than using
my intellect?" Thomas asked members
of the National Bar Association, a
mostly black legal group. "It was
intoxicating to act upon one's rage, to
wear it on one's shoulder, to be defined
by it. Yet, ultimately, it was destructive."
In fact, Thomas' radicalism, much like
his short-lived Afro, never suited him.
Thomas' new activism ran counter to the
discipline and order instilled years
earlier by his grandfather, and his leftist
politics alienated the two men.
At Holy Cross, Thomas also developed
deep reservations about affirmative
action, feeling that people assumed
because he was black that he was not
qualified to be there, he told others later.
The self- consciousness intensified when
Thomas was admitted under Yale's
affirmative action program as one of 12
blacks in a class of 165.
Years later, Thomas expressed his
concerns about affirmative action to
Allen Moore, Missouri Sen. John
Danforth's legislative director in
Washington.
"He said, 'Imagine how it feels if you are
a black who feels you deserve to be
there, you carried your load --- maybe
more than your load --- and then you
leave with a . . . degree that the world
then discounts."
At Yale, Thomas chose a different career
track than other black law students.
Rather than civil rights, he focused on
business and tax law, some of the most
arcane and difficult courses at Yale.
He thought he could earn more money in
business law. But when the big law firms
interviewed him, Thomas said later, they
seemed mostly interested in him because
he was black.
"Prospective employers dismissed our
grades and diplomas, assuming we got
both primarily because of preferential
treatment," Thomas told biographer
Norman L. Macht.
Thomas later told his friend Chris
Brewster, a Washington lawyer, about a
black friend who had been hired by a biglaw firm.
"It was some fancy-schmancy building
with glass walls, and they put him in an
office where he was very prominent,
where you could see him," said
Brewster. The lesson for Thomas was
simple: "I don't want to be that guy."
Danforth, as attorney general of
Missouri, initially hired Thomas in 1974
because he was looking for qualified
minorities to work for him. When
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Thomas took the job, he made one
request: He would not work on civil
rights cases.
"He wanted to be competing with people
and dealing with people on a whole
range of issues," said Danforth.
A crucial step
Escaping racial stereotyping, however,
proved difficult in Washington, where
there were few black Republicans. So
when the Reagan administration cast
about for a conservative to oversee civil
rights at the Department of Education,
Thomas seemed the perfect fit.
Only Thomas didn't want the job. "He
came to me and said, 'I have resisted all
of my life going into the track of the
black, to work on civil rights
discrimination,' " recalled Moore. "That
was the 'marginalize-them track.' "
Thomas took the Reagan administration
job anyway, against his principles,
because it gave him more responsibility
and more money. But it proved a crucial
step in his path to the Supreme Court.
Less than a year later, he was named
chairman of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, where chance
connections again played a decisive role
in his career.
Thomas' vice chairwoman at the EEOC
was marned to Laurence Silberman, a
judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit and a
veteran of three Republican
administrations.
Silberman recommended Thomas years
later to the Bush administration for
consideration as a judge.
Eager to advance black Republicans in
the judiciary, Bush named Thomas to the
D.C. Circuit in 1989, and followed up
with a nomination to the Supreme Court
on July 1, 1991, 16 months after he was
confirmed to the D.C. Circuit.
Battle-scarred and weary
When he arrived on the court in October
1991, Thomas was a physical and
emotional wreck after a 107-day
confirmation battle. Thomas felt
constantly fatigued, and he told his law
clerks that he couldn't stay focused. At
the end of his first term, Thomas
collapsed with exhaustion and was sick
for two months.
But the Supreme Court was the perfect
place for Thomas. The insulation and
seclusion of the court gave him time to
recuperate from his confirmation ordeal.
Thomas' worst fear --- that his new
colleagues would shun him --- never
materialized. His colleagues embraced
him, an act of kindness that Thomas
never fails to mention.
Ten years later, Thomas speaks with a
reverence for the court that suggests
there is no other place he'd rather be.
From the beginning, Thomas was
different from the other justices. He was
only 43, barely half the age of some of
his colleagues. He was less formal than
they were, and he took time to chat with
all the court employees, from cafeteria
workers to police officers.
He prevailed on court administrators to
update the exercise equipment so he
could keep up his regular workout. He
played basketball with employees at the
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court's private gym, dubbed "the
highest court in the land."
Thomas' youth subtly affected the court
in other ways. More savvy about
technology than the other justices,
Thomas pushed the court to update its
computer infrastructure, get wired to the
Internet, and develop secure systems so
justices could access records from their
home computers.
He took an interest in administration and
was made a member of the Supreme
Court's budget committee, appearing
before Congress every year for the past
few years to explain the court's budget
needs.
Outspoken and political in both the
legislative and executive branches of
government, Thomas hasn't tempered his
political activism in the judicial branch,
and this frankness has made him a
conservative icon. In February, at an
American Enterprise Institute dinner
honoring Thomas, a long line of GOP
luminaries lined up to shake his hand,
including former independent counsel
Kenneth Starr, noted Clinton antagonist
Barbara Olsen and former GOP vice
presidential nominee Jack Kemp.
He has spoken at most of the nation's
major conservative organizations and
think tanks, including the Federalist
Society, the Hudson Institute and Phyllis
Schlafly's Eagle Forum. He has chosen
some of these venues to deliver pointed
remarks. In 1999, he charged that special
interest groups, which played a huge role
in his own nomination battle, have
corrupted the judicial confirmation
process.
Two years ago, he accused the American
Bar Association of bias in its evaluation
of presidential appointees to the federal
bench. In March, the Bush
administration stopped giving the ABA
advance notice of appointments for their
review.
Some of his arguments ring hollow.
Thomas has complained about the
treatment he received during his
confirmation. Yet when Republicans
attacked President Clinton's judicial
nominees for judicial activism, Thomas
defended their right to do so.
"Judges simply do not need protection
from the slings and arrows of mere
words," Thomas said in a 1999 speech.
"We are not that fragile."
The science of law
In his 10 years on the court, Thomas has
developed a highly methodical and
disciplined approach to deciding cases.
Thomas believes the law is a science,
and that standardized procedures will
invariably lead to the correct outcome.
The work habits he learned from his
grandfather have stayed with him. He
comes to work early, often before 6 a.m.
He spends hours reading and studying
the briefs --- often at home in the middle
of the night. He says he's always
thinking about cases, even while
mowing the lawn.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, who sits next
to Thomas on the bench, said recently he
frequently relies on Thomas during oral
arguments to tell him where he can find
certain facts in the case briefs. Thomas'
memory for details, he said, is
"photographic."
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Thomas' opinions are not flowery or
given to esoteric wanderings. He writes
simply and plainly, seeking to make
every opinion understood to both
lawyers and "gas station attendants," as
he said recently.
Before every oral argument, Thomas sits
down with his four clerks to discuss the
cases on the docket. Sometimes, these
sessions last four or five hours and
become quite animated.
"His main instruction to us was that he
didn't want to hear an issue or a question
in oral argument that he had not already
heard about or thought about himself,"
said Greg Coleman, who worked for
Thomas in 1995 and 1996.
Thomas' clerks play a central role in his
preparations. He hires only those who
have clerked in the federal court system,
and only those who finished in the top
10 percent of their law school class.
Thomas also chooses clerks who mirror
his own conservative views and
outspokenness.
"He wants free thinkers," said John Yoo,
who clerked for Thomas in 1994 and
1995. "He wants people to speak up with
views that may be wacky or that haven't
been argued for 100 years, but he wants
to hear the whole range of views."
At the beginning of each term, Thomas
gives his clerks two guidelines: They are
never to bargain points of law to secure
the votes of other justices, and they are
never to write opinions that criticize
another justice.
"Ideas are open for attack, but the people
never are," said Coleman. "He would
never permit a draft to come to his desk
that had a disparaging remark about
another justice."
The quiet man
On a recent April morning, the Supreme
Court sat for oral arguments. Thomas
listened to the lawyers, shared private
words with Justice Stephen Breyer, who
sits on his left, and stared at the
ceiling, reclining so steeply in his black,
leather chair that it seemed he might tip
over.
All eight of his colleagues asked
questions during the two one- hour
sessions, even though the cases were
routine. Thomas did not.
It's not true that Thomas never asks
questions during oral arguments, as is
commonly believed, but he rarely does.
Thomas' silence is one of the few things
people seem to know about him. Even
his colleagues in the federal judiciary
find it curious; a federal judge from
Augusta asked him point blank about his
reticence at a judicial conference in
Savannah this May.
Thomas has offered various explanations
for his quietness. He has said he believes
oral arguments are meant for the lawyers
arguing their cases. He's said that most
questions get asked anyway, so there
is no need for him to ask one. He has
suggested that his colleagues ask too
many questions, and that some are just
for show.
In some of these explanations, Thomas
has suggested that his mind is already
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made up, implying that oral arguments
are more of a formality.
"Remember, you've already read the
briefs," Thomas said in Savannah. "So
you have an idea where you are going to
come out."
He's also cited more personal reasons,
such as his struggles to learn standard
English as a child after growing up
around coastal black dialects.
Several of Thomas' friends have urged
him to ask more questions so people
don't infer he's less knowledgeable than
his colleagues. But Thomas refuses.
"His feeling is, what does he care?" said
Kansas University law professor Steve
McAllister, one of Thomas' first clerks.
A true originalist
After 10 years on the court, some
analysts regard Thomas as the most
conservative justice.
In legal terms, Thomas is an originalist,
meaning he believes in deciding cases
based on the original meaning of the
Constitution. He views the Constitution
as a contract that was entered into by the
framers, and he sees his role as enforcing
the original terms of the bargain.
He's established himself as an ardent
supporter of states' rights and he's deeply
hostile to what he perceives as the
encroaching power of the federal
government.
More recently, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist appears to be giving Thomas
the lead in articulating the court's more
tolerant position on the separation
between church and state. Several
majority opinions by Thomas have
established that government aid may
flow to religious groups provided it is
equally available to other groups, a
shift from earlier rulings that tended to
subject religious organizations to a
different standard.
Thomas' concurring opinion in a 1995
case, Rosenberger v. University of
Virginia, argued that government aid
may flow to religious groups provided
the government is neutral in how it
distributes the money. The opinion has
become the legal foundation for the
school voucher movement, according to
Pepperdine University School of Law
professor Douglas Kmiec.
Justices are assigned majority opinions
by the senior judge in the majority, often
Rehnquist. Thomas has assiduously
worked around this limitation by writing
concurring opinions that speak only for
himself. Thomas uses some of these
opinions to throw down markers that go
far beyond what even his conservative
colleagues might consider.
A 1995 concurrence by Thomas, now
required reading in some law school
courses, suggested the court should
overturn six decades of interstate
commerce law. Thomas' position, if
ultimately adopted, would drastically
limit the power of the federal
government to regulate issues such as
gun ownership and working conditions.
Thomas, a target of women's groups
during his confirmation, has not written
much on women's rights. He has voted
to overturn Roe v. Wade guaranteeing a
woman's constitutional right to an
abortion, taking the conservative view
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that the right to privacy articulated in
Roe does not exist in the Constitution.
He has sided with victims of sexual
harassment in cases where the court is
unanimous. But on closely divided
rulings, Thomas tends to side with
fellow conservatives and take a more
restrictive view of when harassment
claims can be brought and how victims
should be compensated.
Some of his votes break the conservative
stereotype. He has been one of the most
liberal justices on the First Amendment,
a fact often overlooked by his critics.
One study found that only Justice
Kennedy took a stronger stance on free
speech rights, although some of these
votes reflect the view that campaign
contributions are a form of speech and
cannot be regulated.
Thomas' biggest legacy on the court,
however, has been his insistence on a
"colorblind" reading of the Constitution
in matters of race, taking particular aim
at affirmative action and preferential
treatment of minorities, according to
Gerber, his judicial biographer.
Over the years, Thomas has voted with
the court's majority, holding that race
cannot be used as the predominant factor
in drawing political districts.
In several key decisions, Thomas has
also been sharply critical of the 1965
Voting Rights Act, which Congress
enacted to stop mostly Southern states
from throwing up barriers to black voter
registration and voting.
Thomas employed some of his harshest
criticism of the Voting Rights Act in a
1994 Georgia case. The suit, brought by
black voters in Bleckley County, argued
that the county's system of electing a
single county commissioner
discriminated against racial minorities.
They argued instead for a five-member
board that would allow blacks to elect a
black representative from majority-black
districts.
Thomas evoked the language of South
African apartheid in his opinion,
concurring with the court majority,
which rejected the plaintiffs claims.
"We have involved the federal courts,
and indeed the Nation, in the enterprise
of systematically dividing the country
into electoral districts along racial lines -
-- an enterprise of segregating the races
into political homelands," Thomas
wrote.
"Our drive to segregate political districts
by race can only serve to deepen racial
divisions by destroying any need for
voters or candidates to build bridges
between racial groups," he continued.
The following year, Thomas drew a
broadside from the civil rights
community when he voted to strike
down an affirmative-action contracting
program in Denver. The ruling forced
governments across the country to
drastically scale back set-aside programs
for minorities.
"So called 'benign' discrimination
teaches many that because of chronic
and apparently immutable handicaps,
minorities cannot compete with them
without their patronizing indulgence,"
Thomas wrote in Adarand Constructors
Inc. v. Pena.
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Thomas has even taken on some of the
legal reasoning behind Brown v. Board
of Education (1954), the landmark civil
rights case that ended segregation in
public schools.
In a Missouri case, in which black
parents challenged lingering inequalities
in Kansas City's school system, Thomas
scolded those who wrote the Brown
decision for relying, in part, on the idea
that segregated schools led blacks to feel
inferior.
"Segregation was not unconstitutional
because it might have caused
psychological feelings of inferiority,"
Thomas wrote.
And then, in language harkening back to
his own experience in segregated,
Catholic schools, Thomas said: "Given
that desegregation has not produced the
predicted leaps forward in black
educational achievement, there is no
reason to think that black students
cannot learn as well when surrounded by
members of their own race as when
they are in an integrated environment."
In 1998, a college student in New York
asked Thomas to rate his impact on the
court so far. "Not much," was the reply,
according to Alfred University professor
Robert Heineman.
But Heineman also recalled a caveat:
"He said, 'I'm a young guy.
I'm going to be on the court another two
decades or so. I think by the time I leave,
I'll have some impact.'"
Contradictory signals
Over the years, Thomas has sent
contradictory signals in how he reacts to
his detractors.
He affects indifference, yet he can't seem
to stop talking back to them. Some of the
more pointed criticisms appear to goad
him into more open defiance.
Just this year, Thomas complained again
about the interpretation of his 1992
dissent involving an Alabama prisoner
who had been beaten by prison guards.
Seven of Thomas' colleagues said the
prisoner was entitled to a claim of cruel
and unusual punishment.
Thomas argued that the Eighth
Amendment was intended to cover cruel
and unusual punishment in sentencing,
not whatever prison conditions might
arise later, which led The New York
Times to label him the "youngest,
cruelest justice."
"I was widely denounced for advocating
the beating of prisoners, which is
ridiculous," Thomas said in February.
"The critics weren't content to argue that
I was analytically wrong --- that I had
misinterpreted the law in making my
decision --- rather they sought my
conformity, or, in the alternative, my
silence."
Thomas has also sought out
opportunities to answer his critics. In
1998, he accepted an invitation to speak
to the National Bar Association,
representing most of the nation's black
lawyers and judges.
"It pains me deeply --- more deeply than
any of you can imagine -- - to be
perceived by so many members of my
race as doing them harm," Thomas said.
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"I come here today not in anger or to
anger," he said. "Nor have I come to
defend my views, but rather to assert my
right to think for myself, to refuse to
have my ideas assigned to me as though
I was an intellectual slave because I'm
black.
"I come to state that I am a man, free to
think for myself and do as I please. I've
come to assert that I am a judge, and I
will not be consigned to the
unquestioned opinions of others. But
even more than that I have come to say
that, isn't it time to move on? Isn't it time
to realize that being angry with me
solves no problems?"
Yet these sentiments tend to mask how
much Thomas relishes being the
contrarian --- the man who says no when
everyone else says yes.
In May, Thomas came home to
Savannah to address members of the
local bar association. Surrounded by old
friends and family, he reflected on his
early dreams of returning to Savannah to
practice law.
"I don't know whether or not I would be
any more popular if I had come home,"
said Thomas, chuckling. "I think there is
a certain pleasure you get from being a
thorn in the side of people."
Copyright C 2001 The Atlanta Journal
and Constitution.
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Divided They Stand; The High Court and the Triumph of Discord
The New York Times
Sunday, July 15, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
TWO federal courthouses here provided
scenes of stark contrast on the last
Thursday in June. At the Supreme Court,
the justices concluded their term by
announcing decisions in four cases, all by
votes of 5 to 4, while almost
simultaneously, less than a mile down
Constitution Avenue, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit announced its
unanimous decision in the Microsoft case.
There was nothing predictable about the
unanimity of the complex 125-page
Microsoft decision. The seven judges who
sat on the case have very different views
of the law in general, and of antitrust law
in particular. But Chief Judge Harry T.
Edwards placed a high priority on the
court speaking with one voice, and by all
accounts worked energetically to
accomplish that goal.
On the other hand, at the Supreme Court
last term, "5 to 4" became a judicial way
of life. From the presidential election --
destined to be among the most
conspicuous and contentious decisions in
American history -- to workplace
arbitration to tobacco advertising to the
ownership of the land under an Idaho
lake, the justices were deeply, irrevocably
divided.
One-third of the term's 79 cases were
decided by 5-to-4 votes -- often but not
always the same 5 and the same 4 -- a
higher proportion than any time in
memory. By the time the term ended, the
announcement of a split decision had
become routine, a familiar reminder of
how much the next appointment to the
court will matter. That appointment, when
it comes, could change the court's, and
hence the nation's, course on nearly every
important constitutional question
currently in debate.
But familiarity should not obscure the fact
that such a deeply divided Supreme Court
is not, historically, at all routine. Whlile the
culture of dissent that now prevails is not
a Rehnquist Court invention, it is a
surprisingly recent development that
illuminates not only this court's approach
to its work but also the modem Supreme
Court's changing relationship to the
country and to the concept of law itself.
Not so long ago, it was considered
ethically dubious for a judge of a high
court even to cast a dissenting vote. "It is
of high importance that judges
constituting a court of last resort should
use effort and self-restraint to promote
solidarity of conclusion" ran a rule that
from 1924 until 1972 was part of the
American Bar Association's code of
judicial conduct. Known as Canon 19, it
warned judges not to "yield to pride of
opinion" and provided that "except in
cases of conscientious difference of
opinion on fundamental principle,
dissenting opinions should be
discouraged."
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CANON 19 reflected the spirit of the
times when the bar association adopted it.
During the 1920's, the Supreme Court
under the leadership of Chief Justice --
and former President -- William Howard
Taft decided more than 80 percent of all
its cases unanimously. Most dissents "are
a form of egotism," the chief justice wrote
in a letter to Justice Willis Van Devanter,
adding: "They don't do any good, and
only weaken the prestige of the court. It is
much more important what the court
thinks than what any one thinks."
The quotation from Justice Van
Devanter's unpublished papers is in an
article by Robert C. Post, a law professor
at the University of California at Berkeley,
published in the May issue of the
Minnesota Law Review. The article
examines what Professor Post calls the
"norm of acquiescence" of the Taft era
and traces its subsequent demise.
Dissent existed in ample measure on the
court of the 1920's, Professor Post
demonstrates through internal court
documents, but the justices suppressed its
public expression for what they saw as the
institution's collective good. By
maintaining a united front, the justices
sought to avoid giving ammunition to the
court's political enemies, who could be
expected to seize on a divided opinion as
evidence that the court was making policy
rather than discovering the one true
answer to a legal question.
But the norm of acquiescence did not last,
and by the 1940's Justice William 0.
Douglas declared in an article, "It is the
democratic way to express dissident
views." Only fascist and Communist
systems insist on "certainty and unanimity
in the law," he said.
The culture of dissent was well
entrenched by the time Justice Antonin
Scalia, who cast 19 dissenting votes in the
last term, wrote in a 1994 article:
"Dissents are simply the normal course of
things. Indeed, if one's opinions were
never dissented from, he would begin to
suspect that his colleagues considered him
insipid, or simply not worthy of
contradiction."
What accounted for the change? Professor
Post argues that the court's own role in
the legal system changed in 1925, when it
gained from Congress the discretion to
pick and choose its own cases. The
Supreme Court was no longer the court of
last resort for private disputes; the justices
could turn down those cases to
concentrate on legal issues with broad
national implications.
WITH the grant of Supreme Court review
a scarce resource -- today the court
decides only about 1 percent of the cases
brought to it -- the stakes for each
carefully chosen case grew higher. The
justices were not simply resolving
particular disputes but superintending the
development of the legal system as a
whole. This new focus in turn bolstered
the concept of law as an evolutionary
process rather than a static set of rules to
be applied to particular facts and,
according to Professor Post, made it less
likely for justices to acquiesce in decisions
with which they did not agree.
According to David M. O'Brien, a
professor of government at the University
of Virginia and the author of several
books on the Supreme Court, the major
turning point came with the approach that
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's
appointees brought to the court.
"The battle over the New Deal taught thatjudges make law," he said. "If judges
makes law, they'd better rationalize it" by
explaining themselves fully, separately if
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necessary.
From that perspective, the court's
performance in the last term represented
the playing out of a powerful historical
trend. But it was something else as well.
There is a revolution in progress at the
court, with Chief Justice William H
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Sandra Day
O'Connor, Anthony t Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas challenging long-settled
doctrines governing state-federal relations,
the separation of powers, property rights
and religion.
These five justices are "interested in
making as much law as they can, sooner
rather than later," said Richard J. Lazarus,
a professor at the Georgetown University
Law Center and director of its Supreme
Court Institute. "They are trying to move
the law," he said, and are "out there
looking for cases" rather than for allies
among the other four justices.
DOES it matter for the stability of the law
or the authority of the court to have so
many cases resolved by such close votes?
There is not much evidence that it does.
The concern that animated the earlier
justices -- that divided decisions might call
into question the legitimacy of judicial
review itself -- now seems quaint. The
country's thinking about the court has
long since incorporated the understanding
that, as Professor Post put it in an
interview, "the court is speaking not from
outside the system, but from inside, as a
player."
In any event, there seems to be not much
correlation between the vote in a case and
its public reception. Many people
probably assume that the vote in Roe v.
Wade, one of the most disputed of
modern Supreme Court decisions, was 5
to 4; it was 7 to 2. Miranda v. Arizona, a
1966 product of the Warren Court, was a
5-to-4 decision that became so ingrained
in the law that a much more conservative
court reaffirmed it last year 7 to 2.
And the notion that justices should bite
their tongues for the collective good is
probably no more realistic for them than
for anyone else in a self-absorbed,
celebrity-obsessed society.
Justices are remembered not for their
silent votes but for what they write,
Professor O'Brien said. "It's the me-
decade, the culture of the individual
voice," he said. We look at the Supreme
Court, in all its jagged and vocal discord,
and see ourselves.
Copyright D 2001 The New York Tints
Company
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The Future of the Establishment Clause
Human Rights
Vol. 28, no. 2 (Spring 2001)
Erwin Chemerinsky
President George W. Bush's nominations
to the Supreme Court are likely to change
dramatically the law of the Establishment
Clause. Conservatives on the Supreme
Court such as Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas have repeatedly urged
overruling precedents limiting aid to
parochial schools and prohibiting school
prayer. (Se, eg, Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District, 508
U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993).) Currently, as
evidenced by the Court's June 2000
decision in Mitdl v Hdrr (120 S. Ct.
2530) (2000)), there are four Justices-
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas- who
desire a radical change in the law of the
Establishment Clause. Thus, even one
appointment to the Court could bring
about this shift.
There is every reason to believe that a
Bush nominee would provide the needed
fifth vote for a dramatic change in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
During his candidacy, Bush explicitly
stated he wanted to appoint justices like
Scalia and Thomas. More importantly,
Bush clearly cares deeply about allowing
more government aid to religion. In one
of his first acts as president, he created an
office for faith-based programs in the
White House to facilitate granting
government money to religious groups for
social services. Bush strongly favors
expansion of such programs and also
endorses school vouchers and tax credits
that can be used for parochial schools.
Additionally, Bush has expressed a desire
for the Court
schools.
to sanction prayer in public
This article describes the likely impact of
Bush's appointments to the Court on the
Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The first section discusses
the test used in Establishment Clause
cases and its likelihood of being overruled
by a Bush Supreme Court. The second
section focuses on aid to religion and the
dramatic impact that even one
appointment could have on the outcome
of key issues such as vouchers and
charitable choice. The final section
examines school prayer, suggesting that
more than one replacement among
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer would be necessary
to change the law in this area. Because
there is some chance that both Stevens,
the eldest on the current Court, and
O'Connor might retire in the next four
years, this also is quite possible. (Chief
Justice William Rehnquist is rumored to
be likely to retire during the next four
years, but even if President Bush
appointed an individual with a similar
conservative philosophy, it would not
alter the outcome in Establishment Clause
cases.)
The Establishment Clause Test
When the Supreme Court first considered
the issue of aid to religion in 1947, it
echoed the words of Thomas Jefferson in
declaring that "[tlhe First Amendment has
erected a wall between church and state.
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That wall must be kept high and
impregnable." (Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).) For several
decades after this, a majority of the Court
unquestionably was committed to strict
separation of religion and government.
(Ira C Lupu, The L iqng Death of
Separationisri 62 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 230
(1994).) The Court thus developed
Establishment Clause doctrines that limit-
ed religion in government, such as for-
bidding prayer in public schools (Se eg,
Abbington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962)) and government presence in
religion, such as limiting aid to parochial
schools. (Se eg., Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971).)
Bush clearly cares deeply
about allowing more
government aid to religion.
For the past thirty years, the Court has
followed a test in Establishment Clause
cases that was announced in Lenin u
Kunzrn (Id) In Lenv the Court
declared: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster an
excessive government entanglement with
religion." (Id at 612.) A law is
unconstitutional if it fails any prong of the
Lena test.
Although there have been many cases in
which the Court decided Establishment
Clause cases without applying this test
(See eg, Board of Education of Kiryas
Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S.
Ct. 2481 (1994); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983)), it has been used
frequently. Several justices have criticized
the test and called for its overrule, but this
has not occurred. (Sae eg, Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 508 U.S. 384, 399 (1993); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992).)
Indeed, Justice Scalia, the primary advo-
cate of overruling the Lenn test, color-
fully lamented its survival and analogized
it to
a ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up
in its grave and shuffles
abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried.
[It] is there to scare us
[when] we wish it to do so,
but we can command it to
return to the tomb at will.
When we wish to strike
down a practice it forbids,
we invoke it, when we wish
to uphold a practice it
forbids, we ignore it entirely.
(Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S., at
398-99 (1993).)
Four justices have indicated that they
want to overrule the Lenan test- Rehn-
quist, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. (Se
eg, Allegheny County v. Greater
Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 660-74
(1989).) They have expressed a desire for a
new test that allows much more gov-
emnment aid to religion and much more of
a religious presence in government. They
call for an "accommodationist" approach
in which the government would violate
the Establishment Clause only if it literally
created a church, favored one religion
over others, or coerced religious
participation. Very little would violate the
Establishment Clause under this
approach, which would emphasize judicial
deference to the government in its choices
concerning religion. Replacing any of the
other five justices could result in this
dramatic change to the law.
Aid to Religious Institutions
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In Mitchell v. Helms (120 S. Ct. 2530
(2000)), four justices called for altering the
Establishment Clause to allow much more
aid to parochial schools. In an opinion
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy, Justice
Thomas argued that the clause is violated
by aid to religion only if the government
favors some religions over others. This
radical change in interpretation would
allow unprecedented aid to religious
schools. The only limitation would be that
the government could not discriminate
among religions.
Justice Thomas, though, went even
further and suggested that precluding
parochial schools from receiving aid is
impermissible:
[T]he inquiry into the
recipient's religious views
required by a focus on
whether a school is
pervasively sectarian is not
only unnecessary but also
offensive. It is well
established, in numerous
other contexts, that courts
should refrain from trolling
through a person's or
institution's religious beliefs .
. . [H]ostility to aid to
pervasively sectarian schools:
has a shameful pedigree that
we do not hesitate to
disavow." (Id. at 2551.)
Following this approach would mean
that denying religious schools funding
that is available to other schools, as has
always been the law, violates the
Constitution.






equipment to religious schools. In earlier
cases, the Court had ruled that the
government cannot give instructional
equipment to parochial institutions if the
equipment could be used for religious
instruction. (See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittinger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975).) In Mitchel4 six
justices rejected this limitation, though
they did not agree on an alternative test.
Never before has a justice
suggested, let alone a plurality
endorsed, such a radical change in
the law of the Establishment Clause,
Justice Thomas's plurality opinion, joined
by Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy, could
not be clearer in its call to allow aid to
parochial schools so long as the
government is evenhanded among
religions. Justice Thomas wrote: "In short,
nothing in the Establishment Clause
requires the exclusion of pervasively
sectarian schools from otherwise
permissible aid programs, and other
doctrines of this Court bar it. This
doctrine, born of bigotry, should be
buried now." (Id at 2552.)
The majority rejected this approach and
explicitly recognized that it would be a
radical and unprecedented shift in the law
of the Establishment Clause. Justice
O'Connor, in an opinion concurring in
the judgment, observed, "[W]e have never
held that a government-aid program
passes constitutional muster solely
because of the neutral criteria it employs
as a basis for distributing aid." (Id. at
2557.) Similarly, Justice Souter in dissent
wrote, "The insufficiency of evenhanded
neutrality as a stand-alone criterion of
constitutional intent or effect has been
clear from the beginning of our interpre-
tative efforts." (Id at 2581.)
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Never has a majority of the Supreme
Court held that neutrality is the sole test
for government aid to religions, as justice
Thomas argued for in MitddL Sub an
approach would profoundly change the
law because the clause no longer would be
a barrier to government aid to religion or
religious presence in government. For at
least a half-century, the Court regarded
the Establishment Clause as an affirmative
limit on what the government may do,
even if it is acting neutrally among
religions. Justice Thomas would reject that
entirely.
Even more significantly, justice Thomas's
approach indicates that the government
rast fund parochial school education to
the extent that it provides aid to private
secular schools. This clearly implies that
exc!uding religion is not neutral and
constitutes impermissible discrimination
under the clause.
Justice Thomas argued that it is offensive
for the government even to consider
whether an organization is religious in
character "The inquiry into the recipient's
religious views required by a focus on
whether a school is pervasively sectarian is
not only unnecessary but also offensive. It
is well established, in numerous other
contexts, that courts should refrain from
trolling through a person's or institution's
religious beliefs." (Id at 2551.) But if the
government cannot consider religious in
distributing money, it will be nyuidr to
subsidize religious schools on the same
terms that it funds non-religious ones.
Justice Thomas acknowledges and
endorses this: "The religious nature of a
recipient should not matter to the consti-
tutional analysis, so long as the recipient
adequately furthers the government's
secular purpose." (Id)
Justice Thomas' equality approach would
not simply allow but would mandate
massive government aid to religious
institutions. Never before has a justice
suggested, let alone a plurality endorsed,
such a radical change in the law of the
Establishment Clause.
In the near future, the Supreme Court will
likely face major issues concerning aid to
religion, including the constitutionality of
school voucher programs and charitable
choice programs that allow faith-based
groups to receive government money to
provide social services. Based on Mithdl
u Helns, it is clear that four justices-
Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas- are willing to allow such aid so
long as it does not discriminate among
religious. President Bush's addition of one
more justice who shares this philosophy
would ensure that these and other
programs aiding religion would be
pernitted.
Prayer in Schools
For nearly forty years, the Supreme Court
has held that even prayer in public schools
is unconstitutional. (Sa eg, Abbington
School Dist. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).) In June 2000, the Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional student-
delivered prayers at high school football
games. Santa Fe Independent School
District Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000). This
case was decided by a six to three margin,
with Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
dissenting. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the dissent saw the majoritys
opinion as unjustified "hostility" to
religion. (Id at 2283.)
Significantly, Justice Kennedy has been
unwilling to join the three most
conservative justices on the issue of
school prayer. In addition to deciding with
the majority in Santa Fe, Justice Kennedy
wrote the opinion for the Court in Le, ,
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Weisrran (505 U.S. 577 (1992)), which
declared unconstitutional clergy-delivered
prayers at public school graduations. In
L&, Justice Kennedy emphasized the
inherent coercion to such prayers. He did
not join justice Scalia's biting dissent that
stressed accommodating those who
desired to pray. (Id at 645.)
Therefore, Bush would likely have to
replace two justices from among Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and
Ginsburg to overrule the many precedents
limiting prayer in public schools. It is
possible that two of these justices might
retire in the next four years, and there is
no doubt that conservatives will push for
replacements who would vote to overrule
the precedents prohibiting prayer in public
schools.
Conclusion
Conservatives long have lamented
Supreme Court decisions that interpret
the Establishment Clause to limit aid to
parochial schools and prohibit prayer in
public schools. The Bush presidency and
anticipated vacancies on the Supreme
Court create the likelihood that
conservatives might get their wish to
overrule these decisions. Of course, it all
depends on who leaves the Court, who is
appointed, and how newly appointed
justices ultimately vote. But one thing is
fairly certain we can expect to see major
shifts in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence in the years to come.
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Be Advised: 'Adarand' and Affimative Action Will be Back on the 
Docket
American Lawyer
Monday, July 2, 2001
Stephen J. Wermiel
To lawyers throughout the land, the
name Adarand Constructors is already
synonymous with the movement to limit
affirmative action in the public sector. Be
advised: When the Supreme Court
returns next October, Adarand, and
affirmative action, will be back on the
docket. This latest challenge to
affirmative action in government
contracts is just one of some 40 cases
that the high court has agreed to hear
next term. As the justices recessed last
week, they left behind a fall agenda that
includes free speech, the death penalty,
the Americans With Disabilities Act, and
the ongoing battle over
telecommunications regulation. Here are
a dozen of the most challenging cases:
Affirmative Action. No case is likely to
divide the justices more deeply than
Adarand Comtrcto Inc v Mirta, No. 00-
730. In 1995, in an earlier incarnation of
the same case, the Court ruled 5-4 that all
racial classifications by any level of
government--local, state, or federal--must
be subjected to the highest level of
scrutiny under the equal protection
guarantee implied in the Fifth
Amendment and spelled out in the 14th
Amendment. The standard applied in
Adarand C rnxmtors v Pea means that
government programs using race as a
basis for decision making must be
"narrowly tailored" to advance a
"compelling interest."
Now Adarand contends that the 10th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals erred last
September when it upheld the U.S.
Department of Transportation's
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
program. The program in its current form
gives a competitive contracting advantage
to economically disadvantaged businesses
and then makes it easier for
minority owned firms to claim
disadvantaged status. The 10th Circuit
ruled that Congress, which authorized the
program, was justified in trying to
eliminate the effects of past
discrimination, even under the most
exacting form of constitutional scrutiny.
Adarand argues that the Court's scrutiny
of the use of race was too lenient. The
Bush administration hasn't filed its brief
yet and faces the dilemma of whether to
defend a federal program that appears
inconsistent with the previously expressed
views of the president, Attorney General
John Ashcroft, and Solicitor General
Theodore Olson.
Pornography. Two separate appeals by
the Justice Department address the touchy
question of regulating pornography
online. Ashorfi v AnETican Ci Lies
Uion, No. 00-1293, challenges a 1998
federal law that makes it a crime for
commercial Web sites to display
pornography without safeguards designed
to restrict access by minors. The Child
Online Protection Act was passed after
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the Supreme Court struck down Congress'
first attempt to shield minors from
Internet porn.
Last June, the 3rd Circuit blocked the
1998 law from taking effect. The court
said that the law's determination of what
is "harmful to minors" based on
"contemporary community standards"
was unworkable for Web sites, which, of
course, operate nationally with no control
over the location of individual visitors. In
Ash-tr v Fne Spah o2Nlitran, No. 00-795,
the justices will review a ruling by the 9th
Circuit striking down part of a 1996
federal law that prohibits computer-
generated child pornography. The Child
Pornography Prevention Act expanded
the definition of child porn to include a
"visual depiction" that "appears to be" a
minor engaging in sexual activity. The
court said that since no actual children
were involved, Congress was simply trying
to censor "evil ideas" in violation of the
First Amendment.
Adult Bookstores. City of Lo Argds v
Alanrda Boks, No. 00-799, will test the
power of cities under the First
Amendment to restrict the number of
adult businesses at a single location. The
9th Circuit struck down a Los Angeles
ordinance that barred operation of more
than one adult business in a building and
defined a combined bookstore and video
arcade as two separate businesses. While
zoning laws have been an important
means of regulating the sex industry, the
appeals court said Los Angeles failed to
show that having two related businesses at
one location would increase the harmful
effects.
Public Protest. In Thon-s u Chicago Park
Distrit, No. 00-1249, the justices will
decide whether a local ordinance must
guarantee a quick court ruling on any
decision to deny a permit for a public
rally. The 7th Circuit found that the
ordinance provided adequate access to the
courts for those challenging denial of a
permit for a 1997 rally in favor of
legalizing marijuana. But federal appeals
courts are divided on what kind of court
review is required under First Amendment
standards.
Death Penalty. One of the most closely
watched cases of the next term will be
McCzrer v North Candina, No. 00-8727.
Does executing convicted murderers who
are mentally retarded violate the Eighth
Amendment prohibition of cruel and
usual punishment? The answer will turn
on the Supreme Court's view of whether
society's "evolving standards of decency"
reflect a consensus against executing the
mentally retarded. At least 15 death
penalty states have specifically barred
executing the mentally retarded, but many
capital punishment states still permit it.
Privatization. In Conatzonal Seruas CGOP.
v Malko, No. 00-860, a private company
performing government tasks is being
sued for allegedly violating the
constitutional rights of an individual. The
Supreme Court has allowed these suits
against federal agents who violate
individual rights, but ruled in 1994 that
such suits weren't allowed against federal
agencies. The 2nd Circuit said that this
constitutional rights suit could be filed
against a company that ran a halfway
house for the Federal Bureau of Prisons.
The high court's ruling would likely apply
to many other private companies that now
administer a broad range of government
functions.
Disabilities. Two cases will provide
guidance on the scope of the Americans
With Disabilities Act. In Toyta Moor
Mamcadwing Kentudey Inc v Wdlians, No.
00-1089, the issue is whether repetitive
stress injuries are a disability under the
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In US Airuays Ic v Banwtt, No. 00-1250,
the question is whether the ADA
requirement that an employer make a
"reasonable accommodation" for disabled
workers can require the employer to
override its seniority system. The 9th
Circuit said yes.
Telecommunications. The justices have
also taken on some highly complex
regulatory disputes. One set of cases --
National Cdle TV A ssoatin v GulfPouer
Ca and Fakral Commicatis Cnwissin
V GulfPover Ca, Nos. 00-832 and 00-843 -
- asks whether the FCC may regulate the
rates that utility companies charge cable
operators for using utility poles and
underground facilities to provide high-
speed Internet access.
Another set of five cases addresses the
FCCs regulation of the fees that local
telephone companies charge new rivals
for use of their existing networks. The
cases are: Verizon ( mknica Inc v
FCC, No. 00-511; Woddamn V Verizan
Cmm icatie In, No. 00-555; FCC v
Io=z Utilitif Bcamd, No. 00-587; A T& T;
CoP.v I=a Utilitie Bcan No. 00-590;
and Gerral Cnamicatiam In v Iowa
Utiliti6 Ban4 No. 00-602.
Finally, the justices will rule on whether
the decisions of state regulators under the
1996 Telecommunications Act may be
challenged in federal court. The combined
cases are: Mahis v Wodam Tehdog
Im, No. 00-878; Verizon MD. In v Public
Senice CoMnssion cfMD, No. 00-1531; and
Unital Statu u Public Senice cOnnssn ofMD, No. 00- 1711.
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